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I. INTRODUCTION

The co-existence of tangible and intangible property is central to the
regulation of information products. The commercialization of musical
recordings, books, films, video games, computer software involves a
duality between intangible and tangible property. The copyright holder
owns the intellectual property rights to the literary, dramatic, musical or
artistic work (intangible property), while the recipient of the information
product would usually own (but not always) the copy to the information
product (tangible property).1 At a broader level, information products
embed an artistic, literary, functional, intangible component that prevails
over their concrete, physical, and tangible embodiment.
Increasingly, recipients have access to information products online,
without a physical object embodiment (such as a paperbook, a CD, DVD,
video, disc). One could easily predict that information products with no
supporting physical object will soon outnumber (if they have not already)
the ones that are embedded in a physical supporting medium.2 The online
distribution of information products brings a different dimension to the
traditional tangible and intangible property divide: the products that are
offered with a physical supporting medium (associated to something
tangible) are in several instances regulated differently from the ones that
are not (i.e., of an immaterial character).
Recipients have much to gain from the disembodiment of the
information products that they enjoy at the tip of their fingers: freed
physical space, flexibility with respect to how and when they access the
information product, on which devices, with no physical degradation of
their copy. At the same time, the disembodiment of information products
breaks traditional boundaries and blurs the lines between suppliers and
recipients. Do the recipients own the copies that they access online or
1. For a discussion on the nature of copies of copyright works and how they embed this
duality, see Pascale Chapdelaine, Living in the Shadow of the Intangible: the Nature of the Copy
of a Copyrighted Work Part One, 23 INTELL. PROP. J. 83 (2010) & Pascale Chapdelaine, Living in
the Shadow of the Intangible: the Nature of the Copy of a Copyrighted Work Part Two, 23 INTELL.
PROP. J. 205 (2011).
2. See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual & Personal
Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1238–45 (2015) (showing the transformation or
“erosion” of copies of copyright works and the impact it has on copyright law).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2722338

2015]

THE UNDUE RELIANCE ON PHYSICAL OBJECTS

67

rather, are they licensees of the copies? Do recipients benefit from a
service or access a combination of goods and services? Are recipients’
access to information products restricted by suppliers’ digital locks or
other technological protection measures? Do recipients benefit from
implied conditions and warranties to the same way that they do when their
information products are embedded in a physical object? These shifting
lines of demarcation between suppliers and recipients beg the question:
to what extent are recipients’ gains of convenience offset by changing
rules of engagement? Are recipients gaining, or progressively losing
power?
The purpose of this Article is to critically analyze the root causes and
justifications supporting the different treatment of information products
that are embodied in a physical object from the ones that are not. The
divide in the treatment of different forms of property is to a large extent
arbitrary and we need to take a closer look at the profound effects that it
may have on the regulation of information products, and the balance of
powers between suppliers and recipients. Part II considers the effects of
the overemphasis on a physical object in defining goods and services and
the consequent rippling effects it has on enforcing sales and licenses. The
Article will then delve into further illustrations of the emphasis on a
physical object on the application of the first sale or exhaustion doctrine
and on what exclusive copyright acts are involved in the
commercialization of information products. Part III explains the root
causes of the current overemphasis on the presence of a physical object
through misconceptions of property and through the active role that
suppliers play in shaping the nature of information products. I observe
how the over emphasis on a physical object progressively decreases
recipients’ ownership powers and privileges to information products,
thereby creating double standards that may lead to a legal and normative
degradation. Part IV proposes to redefine personal tangible property by
looking at what its essential attributes should be. In particular, the concept
of ownership “as an organizing idea,”3 should help discern when personal
property rights of recipients of information products should be
recognized and enforced in conjunction with the need to constrain the
effects that supplier contracts have on the personal property rights of
recipients of information products.
II. THE DIVIDING LINE CREATED BY THE PRESENCE OF A
PHYSICAL OBJECT
Courts and legislatures have been grappling for some time with the
3. I refer to the theory of ownership developed by JAMES W. HARRIS, PROPERTY
JUSTICE (1996).

AND
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application of traditional legal doctrines to the immaterial world.4 The
law of theft and the tort of conversion are examples that come to mind.5
In the case of information products, the presence of a physical object has
an impact on the qualification of information products as goods, with
rippling effects on the enforcement of sales and licenses, on the
application of the first sale or exhaustion doctrine, and on what exclusive
copyright acts are involved in the commercialization of information
products.
A. Definition of Goods and Services
Commercial copies of information products that are sold through the
hand-to-hand supply of a physical medium (such as music CDs or film
DVDs) are generally characterized as goods under sale of goods law.6 In
doing so, courts have at times applied a reasoning by analogy and
assimilation. Familiar objects such as discs and tapes, which have long
been recognized as goods, justify that the predominant feature of the
product—the musical recording, the film, or computer software—is also
considered to be a good.
By contrast, the applicability of sale of goods—(and consumer)—lawimplied obligations to digital content supplied online is still an unsettled
area of the law.7 In sale of goods and consumer law, “goods” generally
refer to (tangible) “chattels personal,” “personal property,” or, in civil law
4. See R. v. Stewart, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963 (Can. Ont.), where the Supreme Court of Canada
held that confidential information could not be the subject of theft under s. 283 of Canada’s
Criminal Code. See also SARAH GREEN & JOHN RANDALL, THE TORT OF CONVERSION 118–43
(2009).
5. Id.
6. Numerous cases in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom have
recognized that copies of information products embedded in a physical medium are “goods” often
in cases involving the application of sale of goods law implied obligations. See, e.g., Gerber
Scientific Instrument Co. v. Bell-N. Research, Ltd. (1991), 5 B.L.R. (2d) 20, 1991 CarswellOnt
149 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Lalese Enters., Inc. v. Arete Techs., Inc. (1994), 59 C.P.R. (3d) 438, 1994
CarswellBC 1220 (B.C. S.C.); W. Eng’g Serv., Ltd. v. Canada Malting Co., 50 A.C.W.S. (3d)
345, 1994 CarswellOnt 3090; Classified Directory Publishers, Inc. v. Image Mgmt. Techs., Inc.,
1995 CarswellOnt 2449 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Michael’s Pizzeria, Ltd. v. LP Computer Solutions,
Inc., 139 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 295, 433 A.P.R. 295, 1996 CarswellPEI 31 (P.E.I. T.D.); Villeseche v.
Total N. Commc’n, Ltd., 1997 CarswellYukon 53 (Y.C.A.); W.J. Caul Funeral Home,
Ltd. v. Pearce (1997), 475 A.P.R. 252 (Nfld. T.D.); Saskatoon Gold Brokers, Inc. v. Datatec
Computer Sys., Ltd. (1986), 55 Sask. R. 241, 1986 CarswellSask 401 (Sask. Q.B.); in the United
States, see RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985); in the United
Kingdom, see St. Albans City & Dist. Council v. Int’l Computers, Ltd., [1996] EWCA (Civ.)
1296 (Eng.); Kingsway Hall Hotel, Ltd. v. Red Sky IT (Hounslow), Ltd., 2010 WL 1639690 (QB).
7. See MARCO B.M. LOOS ET AL., FINAL REPORT: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, LAW &
ECONOMICS ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POSSIBLE
FUTURE RULES ON DIGITAL CONTENT CONTRACTS 32 (2011) (analyzing the laws of 11 countries,
including the United States, United Kingdom, France, and other European states).
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jurisdictions, “movable property,”8 and often exclude “things in action.”9
As a result, the qualification of information products as goods still largely
depends on the definition of tangible property and “choses in action” or
intangible property.
If copies of information products distributed online with no
supporting physical media are not goods under the relevant statutory
provisions of sale of goods and consumer laws, they cannot benefit from
the protection mechanisms offered through implied sale of goods and
consumer obligations.10 This limits the protection to any remaining
8. Québec Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P.40.1, art. 1(d) (Can.) [hereinafter
QCPA] defines goods as “any movable property,” which is defined in Civil Code of Quebec,
CQLR, c. C-1991, art. 905 (Can.) [hereinafter CCQ], as “[t]hings which can be moved either by
themselves or by an extrinsic force.” Art. 907 CCQ states that all other property, if not qualified
by law is movable. Thus the definition of goods is broad and would include incorporeal property
(art. 899 CCQ). In France, CODE DE LA CONSOMMATION, art. L211 provides that the provisions
dealing with warranties of conformity apply to movable, corporeal property. Other articles of the
CODE DE LA CONSOMMATION, for instance, the ones dealing with information disclosure
requirements (L111) and the ones dealing with unfair commercial practices (L120) refer to
“property” which is not defined, and would thus include movable and immovable property.
9. Ontario Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S-1, § 1(1) (Can.) [hereinafter OSGA]
(defining goods as “chattels personal, other than things in action,” which dictates the scope of
application of implied obligations in consumer contracts); Ontario Consumer Protection Act, S.O.
2002, c. 30, sched. A, §§ 9 (2) & (3) (Can.) [hereinafter OCPA]. Id. § 1 (showing a broader
definition of goods as “any type of property” which would apply to other consumer protection
obligations under the OCPA). See also British Columbia Sale of Goods Act, RSBC, 1996, c.410,
§ 1(a) (Can.), [hereinafter BCSGA]; see also Alberta Sale of Goods Act RSA 2000, c. S-2, § 1(h)
(Can.) [hereinafter ASGA]; Alberta Fair Trading Act, RSA 2000, c. F-2, § 1(1)(e) (Can.)
[hereinafter AFTA]. Certain definitions refer to “tangible” personal property: Manitoba
Consumer Protection Act, RSM 1987, C.C.S.M. c. C200, § 1(1) (Can.) [hereinafter MCPA]; New
Brunswick Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, SNB 1978, c. C-18.1, § 1(1) (Can.)
[hereinafter NBCPWLA]. In the European Union, European Community, Parliament and Council
Directive 1999/44/EC of May 25, 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and
associated guarantees [1999] O.J. L 171/07 at 12 [hereinafter Directive 1999/44/EC] art. 1(2)(b)
(defining goods as any “tangible movable item,” with some limited exceptions). In the United
States, the Uniform Commercial Code, Official Text (2000) (amended 2003) [hereinafter U.S.
UCC], § 2-105(1) defines goods as “all things . . . which are movable at the time of identification
to a contract for sale,” and includes “specially manufactured goods,” but excludes information
and “things in action.” Sale of Goods Act 1979, c. 54, § 14(2)(d), § 61 (U.K.) [hereinafter
UKSGA] (defining “goods” as including all “personal chattels, other than things in action and
money”).
10. I.e., the application of statutory implied obligations of quality and of fitness for
purpose, of correspondence with description, of title, quiet possession and freedom from
encumbrances. This requirement originates from the strong underpinnings of sale of good laws
for these particular consumer protection obligations (i.e., consumer-protection-law-implied
obligations typically expressly build upon or refer to sale of goods law in the field of consumer
implied obligations). E.g., OCPA, supra note 9, §§ 9(2), 9(3). Section 9(3) refers to the existing
implied obligations of the OSGA, and adds additional protection for consumer agreements: “Any
term or acknowledgement, whether part of the consumer agreement or not, that purports to negate
or vary any implied condition or warranty under the Sale of Goods Act or any deemed condition
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common law implied obligations, the breach of which may be more
difficult to establish than under their statutory counterparts.11 Implied
obligations, applied within the framework of consumer protection law,
can be invoked more easily, give rise to a broad range of remedies, and
are often mandatory.12 In some cases, copies made accessible online may
benefit from the protection of implied obligations as they apply to
services.13
Is the requirement of a physical object to qualify information products
or warranty under this Act is void.” In the United Kingdom, the UKSGA provides implied
obligations for sale of “goods.” UKSGA, supra note 9, §§ 2, 12–14 and Services Act 1982, 1982,
c. 29, §§ 1(1) & (2) (U.K.) [hereinafter UKSGSA] (providing implied obligations in “contracts
for the transfer of goods” such as the supply of labor and materials and hire contracts). Id. §§ 2(1)
& (2), 6(1)–(3), 11N(2)(b)). The Directive 1999/44/EC, applies to “goods.” Directive 199/44/EC,
supra note 9, art. 1(2)(b), 2 (1)). The U.S. UCC, sections 2-312, 2-314, and 2-315 also apply to
transactions in “goods.” U.S. UCC, supra note 9, §§ 2-312, 2-314, 2-315.
11. St. Albans, Sir Iain Glidewell in obiter, stated that an implied obligation would apply
at common law to computer software supplied under contract, citing Trollope & Colls, Ltd. v.
N.W. Metro. Reg’l Hosp. Bd., (1973) 1 WLR 601, at 609:
An unexpressed term can be implied if and only if the court finds that the parties
must have intended that term to form part of their contract; it is not enough for
the court to find that such a term would have been adopted by the parties as
reasonable men if it had been suggested to them; it must have been a term that
went without saying, a term which, though tacit, formed part of the contract
which the parties made for themselves.
Sir Iain Glidewell then concluded on that basis that “In the absence of any express term as to
quality or fitness for purpose, or of any term to the contrary, such a contract is subject to an implied
term that the program will be reasonably fit for, i.e. reasonably capable of achieving the intended
purpose.” The court applied this passage of Sir Iain Glidewell’s obiter in Horace Holman Group,
Ltd. v. Sherwood Int’l Group, Ltd., 2000 WL 491372 (TCC).
12. For example in Canada, see OCPA, supra note 9, § 9(3); see also QCPA, supra note 8,
§§ 261, 262; Saskatchewan Consumer Protection and Business Practices Act, c. C-30.2 of the
Statutes of Saskatchewan, 2013, 5.15(1) [hereinafter SCPBA]; NBCPWLA, supra note 9, § 24.
However in limited circumstances, it can be limited by contract, unless “it would not be fair or
reasonable to allow reliance on such agreement.” Id. § 25. BCSGA, supra note 9, §§ 18, 20; Nova
Scotia Consumer Protection Act, RSNS 1989, c. 92, 26 (3) (d) & (f) [hereinafter NSCPA]; MCPA,
supra note 9, § 58(1). ROBERT BRADGATE, CONSUMER RIGHTS IN DIGITAL PRODUCTS 20 (2010)
(referring to three main characteristics of implied obligations under §§ 12 to 15 of UKSGA: “(a)
they are easy to prove; (b) their breach allows the consumer buyer to seek to bring into play a
range of powerful remedies; and (c) neither they nor liability for their breach can be excluded
where the buyer ‘deals as consumer.’”). See also id. at 26, 49.
13. This would then give rise to different regimes of protection. In the case of services, for
example under the OCPA, supra note 9, § 9(1) the implied warranty applicable to services is that
the services are of a “reasonably acceptable quality.” See also MCPA, supra note 9, § 58(6)
(providing a non-mandatory implied warranty, “that the services sold shall be provided in a
satisfactory manner”); UKSGSA, supra note 10, § 14(2) (providing that “there is an implied term
that the goods supplied under the contract are of satisfactory quality.”). See also BRADGATE, supra
note 12, at 28–29.
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as goods falling under the protection of statutory sale of goods and
consumer laws a relevant criterion and if so, under what rationale? The
requirement that an information product must have a physical
embodiment or aspect to be considered a good was stated in the English
Court of Appeal judgment St. Albans City & District Council v.
International Computers, Ltd.14 Sir Iain Glidewell, in a frequently cited
obiter dictum, stated that the presence or not of a physical medium to
supply the copy of the computer software would be the decisive factor to
determine whether a computer program qualified as a good or not.15
Canadian and American courts have also been more readily inclined to
find that copies of information products are goods in presence of the
supply of a hand-to-hand physical object.16 Sir Iain Glidewell made the
distinction between the transfer of a computer disc for money, which
would trigger the application of warranties under the applicable sale of
goods law as the allegedly defective instructions (e.g., the code in the
computer program) were part of the disc, and would have made the disc
(i.e., a good) defective.17 However, in this case, the mere provision of a
computer program would not, even though a disc was involved in the
arrangement, have triggered the application of sale of goods warranties
because the installer had transferred the program himself onto the
computer but had retained the disc:
14. St. Albans City & Dist. Council v. Int’l Computers, Ltd., [1996] EWCA (Civ.) 1296
(Eng.).
15. Id. In that case, it was held that the defendant was under an express contractual
obligation to provide the plaintiffs with software that would allow them to accomplish certain
functions. Id. It was therefore not necessary to consider the legal ground (e.g., statutory or
common law) under which implied obligations would apply. Lord Justice Nourse indicated
concurrence with the obiter dictum. Id. This obiter dictum was cited in subsequent judgments:
1996 SLT 604 (Outer House) [Beta Computers].
16. Courts tend to approach contracts for the supply of computer hardware and computer
software as a whole as sale of goods. See BARRY B. SOOKMAN, COMPUTER, INTERNET, AND
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW, loose-leaf ¶ 2.17 (b) (1988). In Arvic Search Services, Inc. v. Foam
Shop, Ltd., 2008 ABPC 256, the court, in obiter dictum, stated that softwares did not constitute
goods. In that case, the issue of the application of implied obligations under the Alberta Sale of
Goods Act, did not need to be addressed as the issue to be tried revolved around the consequences
of non-performance of the contract by both parties. Id. In the United States, courts have been
willing to consider software alone as involving a transaction in goods. See, e.g., Schroeders v.
Hogan, 137 Misc. 2d 738, 742 (N.Y. Cty. Sup. Ct. 1987) ¶ 3 (holding that the U.S. UCC, as
adopted in the State of New York, applied to software licenses even if no hardware was being
transferred); see also Shema Kolainu-Hear Our Voices v. Providersoft, 2010 WL 2075921
(E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2010) (referring to case law supporting treatment of software license as a good
under the U.S. UCC and noting uncertainty in the area). In that case, the parties had agreed to
treat the software license agreement as “goods.” Id. at 199; see also Gross v. Symantec Corp., No.
1200154 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2012), at 9 (holding that a software delivered online with no physical
supporting medium qualified as goods under the California UCC).
17. Int’l Computers, Ltd., [1996] EWCA (Civ.) 1296 (Eng.); see also Southwark LBC v.
IBM UK, Ltd., [2011] EWHC (TCC) 653 (Eng.).
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As I have already said, the program itself is not “goods” within the
statutory definition. Thus a transfer of the program in the way I
have described does not, in my view, constitute a transfer of goods.
It follows that in such circumstances there is no statutory
implication of terms as to quality or fitness for purpose.18
The lower Court in that case had stated, also in obiter dictum, that
software were probably goods.19 The characterization that computer
software without a physical supporting medium are not goods, as per the
obiter by Sir Iain Glidewell, was applied or accepted in subsequent
judgments.20
The determinacy of a physical object to qualify software as a good is
at first blush somewhat surprising. For software and other information
products, the physical medium (i.e., the disc, DVD, book cover and
paper) in which they are embedded has never been a defining component.
It is the literary, functional, and artistic quality that they contain that
distinguishes them from other products. In a judgment preceding St
Albans, Beta Computers (Europe), Ltd v. Adobe Systems (Europe), Ltd,21
Lord Penrose acknowledged the arbitrariness of giving prevalence to the
supporting medium as the determining factor to qualify the object of the
transaction as goods:
It appears to emphasize the role of the physical medium, and to
relate the transaction in the medium to sale or hire of goods. It
would have the somewhat odd result that the dominant
characteristic of the complex product, in terms of value or of the
significant interests of parties, would be subordinated to the
medium by which it was transmitted to the user in analyzing the
18. Int’l Computers, Ltd., [1996] EWCA (Civ.) 1296 at 266.
19. St. Albans City & Dist. Council v. Int’l Computers, Ltd., [1995] FSR 686 (QB) 699
(Eng.):
I am of the view that software probably is goods within the Act. Programs are,
as has been pointed out, of necessity contained in some physical medium,
otherwise they are useless. As Mr Mawrey put it, it is just as much a supply of
goods as if paint were applied to a wall or printing ink to a blank page. It is not
simply abstract information like information passed by word of mouth. Entering
software alters the contents of the hardware.
20. See Horace Holman Grp., Ltd. v. Sherwood Int’l Grp., Ltd., [2001] All E.R. 83 (Eng.);
see also Southwark LBC v. IBM U.K., Ltd., [2011] EWHC (TCC) 653 (Eng.) ¶ 96ff, where in an
obiter dictum Akenhead J. stated that software could constitute goods under UKSGA, but in the
context of the transfer of a supporting physical medium such as a CD. See Your Response, Ltd.
v. Datateam Bus. Media, Ltd., [2014] EWCA (Civ.) 281 (Eng.); Fern Computer Consultancy, Ltd.
v. Intergraph Cadworx & Analysis Solutions, Inc., [2014] EWHC (Ch) 2908 (Eng.).
21. Beta Computers (Europe), Ltd. v. Adobe Sys. (Europe), [1996] S.L.T. 604, 608 (Eng.).
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true nature and effect of the contract. If one obtained computer
programs by telephone, they might be introduced into one’s own
hardware and used as effectively as if the medium were a disk or
CD or magnetic tape.22
Commentators also note the oddity of the requirement that software
be embedded in a physical object to qualify them as goods.23 Yet, the
Court in Beta Computers refused to treat the supply of computer software
as the sale of goods.24 In a recent judgment by the Court of Appeal of
England and Wales, the lack of physical embodiment was a determinant
factor to qualify a database as intangible property and in holding that it
could not be subject to a common law possessory lien.25
Directive 2011/83/EU places a similar emphasis to that of Sir Iain
Glidewell in St. Albans on the presence of a supporting physical medium
exchanged from hand-to-hand, to determine whether copies of
information products (“digital content”) qualify as a good or not.26
Directive 2011/83/EU harmonizes the laws of Member States with
respect to traders’ information disclosure requirements in consumer
contracts, including distance or off-premises contracts, as well as with
respect to formal requirements for these specific types of contracts.27 On
the one hand, copies of information products that are supported by a
physical medium exchanged from hand-to-hand are “goods.”28 On the
other hand, copies distributed online with no physical supporting media
exchanged from hand-to-hand are neither goods nor services, but of a sui
22. Id. at 608–09.
23. On the triviality of the physical medium in comparison to the computer programming,
see also Bonna Lynn Horovitz, Computer Software as a Good Under the Uniform Commercial
Code: Taking a Byte out of the Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U. L. REV. 129, 131–33 (1985). The
confusion that arises from the presence of intellectual property rights and other intangibles and
the physical medium supporting it was noted by Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply?, 35 EMORY L.J. 853, 861–62 (1986). The artificiality
of this distinction in an increasing world of online distribution of copyright works (and generally
information products) is also discussed by P.S. ATIYAH & JOHN N. ADAMS, THE SALE OF GOODS
68–71 (10th ed. 2001). The authors come to this conclusion by a consequential argument, as to
whether liability for a defective software should be different based on how the software is
delivered (i.e., a disc or online (answering this question in the negative)).
24. Lord Penrose qualified the software license agreement as a sui generis contract. Beta
Computers, [1996] S.L.T. 604 (Eng.), at 608.
25. Your Response, Ltd., [2014] EWCA (Civ.) 281 (Eng.) ¶¶ 20–21.
26. E.C., Council and Parliament Directive 2011/83/EU of 22 November 2011 on
Consumer Rights, Amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and
Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, O.J. L 304/64, pmbl. Recital
19 [2011] [hereinafter Directive 2011/83/EU]; see St. Albans City & Dist. Council v. Int’l
Computers, Ltd., [1996] EWCA (Civ.) 1296 (Eng.).
27. Directive 2011/83/EU, supra note 26, pmbl., Recitals 1–2.
28. Id. pmbl., Recital 19.
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generis nature.29 The Green Paper on the Consumer Acquis30 invited
Member States to consider the expansion of the European Union regime
of consumer sale of goods to the supply of digital content.31 This proposal
met fierce resistance,32 with the result that the proposal for reform did not
expand the application of the European consumer sales legal framework
to the supply online of digital content.33 The foundations and rationale
behind the insistence on the presence of a physical supporting medium
exchanged from hand-to-hand for information products to qualify as
“goods” in E.U. regulation are not entirely clear and merit further
investigation.34
It is somewhat surprising that the presence of a physical tangible
product would be a defining attribute of information products, as the
physical embodiment is the ancillary part of the product (such as the CD
of a musical recording or the DVD of a film).35 As acknowledged by Lord
Penrose in Beta Computers,36 the presence or not of a hand-to-hand
physical supporting medium (e.g., a disc) with the copy of an information
product (e.g., a software) as a determinant factor of its nature as good is
somewhat artificial.37
The peculiarity of the requirement of a physical object for information
products to qualify as goods is even more apparent when contrasted to
how other areas of law deal with the immateriality of copies of
information products. For instance, international classifications (e.g., in
the area of trademarks), classify software as goods regardless of the
presence of a supporting tangible medium.38 In the United States, the
29. Id.
30. Commission: Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis, at 3, 2007 O.J. (C
61/1).
31. Id.
32. See Peter Rott, Download of Copyright-Protected Internet Content and the Role of
(Consumer) Contract Law, 31 J. CONSUM. POL’Y 441, 452 (2008) (explaining the resistance
especially with respect to the distribution of online software).
33. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer
Rights, at 2, COM (2008) 614 final (2008) (defining “goods,” leaves unchanged the definition of
“consumer goods” in Directive 1999/44/EC).
34. See discussion infra Parts III & IV.
35. See BRADGATE, supra note 12, at 40–41 (analogizing such reasoning to placing more
emphasis on the packaging than the substance of the product as the test of its qualification, such
as focusing on the bottle of whiskey to determine the nature of whiskey.).
36. Beta Computers (Eur.), Ltd. v. Adobe Sys. (Eur.), [1996] S.L.T. 604, 606 (Eng.).
37. Id.
38. NICE AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS AND
SERVICES FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE REGISTRATION OF MARKS, June 15, 1957, as amended, online,
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/classification/nice/trtdocs_wo019.html. There are 45
registration classes, 34 for goods and 11 for services. Class nine (goods) would cover software.
The explanatory notes to Class nine states that this class includes: “all computer programs and
software regardless of recording media or means of dissemination, that is, software recorded on
magnetic media or downloaded from a remote computer network.” See also INTERNATIONAL
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Copyright Act defines “copy” as: “material objects . . . from which the
work can be perceived . . . either directly or with the aid of a machine
. . . .”39 If “copy” was defined narrowly (i.e., as requiring the form of a
material object (book, CD, DVD)), innumerable unauthorized copies
would not be deemed to infringe copyright. Pointing to the U.S.
Copyright Act definition of “copy” as including “immaterial” machinereadable copies,40 Jean Braucher notes the incongruity that results from
not also treating copies of software as goods under sale of goods law:
“There is no good reason not to extend this version of tangibility,
assuming tangibility is necessary, to the realm of Article 2.”41 “Software
copies are perceivable by a machine and in that sense tangible, making
them easily ‘things,’ which may not require tangibility.”42
Other features of copies of information products may be more relevant
to determine whether they are goods under relevant laws than the
presence of a physical object.
The tangible versus intangible property distinction is also relevant to
distinguish goods from services, through the ordinary meaning of the two
terms.43 In contrast with “goods,” “services” are rarely defined and when
they are, not in a manner that elucidates their nature and scope.44
CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS AND SERVICES UNDER THE NICE AGREEMENT, 10th ed. online, available
at
http://www.wipo.int/classifications/nivilo/nice/index.htm?lang=en#.
The
trademark
classification system fulfills different purposes (i.e., it allows trademark applicants to define for
which types of goods and services they (intend to) use their trademark and claim exclusive rights).
In Canada, “software” falls under the classification of wares and/or of services for the purpose of
trademarks registration. Canadian Intellectual Property Office, “The Wares and Services
Manual,” online, available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/wrs/dsplyPblc Srch.do.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1978).
40. Jean Braucher, Contracting out of Article 2 Using a “License” Label: a Strategy that
Should not Work for Software Products, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 261, 268 (2007).
41. E.g., U.S. UCC, supra note 9 (defining goods as “all things that are movable at the time
of identification to a contract for sale,” including “manufactured goods,” but excluding
information and “choses in action.”).
42. Braucher, supra note 40, at 268.
43. See Fiona Smith & Lorna Woods, A Distinction Without a Difference: Exploring the
Boundary Between Goods and Services in the World Trade Organization and the European
Union, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 60 (2005) (discussing by the authors, the distinction between
tangible and intangible as dictated in part by the ordinary dictionary meaning attributed to “goods”
and “services,” which is the approach chosen by the authors in the context of assessing the
meaning of goods and services in an international trade context, e.g., at the World Trade
Organization level).
44. See, e.g., In the Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, SBC, Official Text
(2004) available at http://www.bclaws.ca/Recon/document/ID/freeside/04002_00 [hereinafter
B.C. Law] (defining services as “services, whether or not the services are together with or separate
from goods, and includes a membership in a club or organization.”); see also AFTA, supra note
9, at 10 (defining services as “any service offered or provided primarily for personal, family or
household purposes” and includes specific examples.); SCPBPA, supra note 12, § 2(h) defines
“services” as “services ordinarily provided for personal, family, or household purposes that have
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Generally though, goods are more readily associated with tangibility, and
services with intangibility. As services are typically involved in the
online delivery of information products, there is a tendency to qualify the
transaction as one involving services only, forgetting that the transfer of
an information product to the recipient may also be involved.45
Traditionally, the Statute of Frauds’ requiring that certain contracts be
in writing to be enforceable, applied only to the sale of goods and not to
the provision of services.46 This has, at times, led courts to make artificial
distinctions between “goods” and “services.”47 In some cases, uncertainty
about the difference between goods and services stems from the
confusion about the difference between the labor involved to deliver the
commercialized end result and the end result itself.48 Such uncertainty
been or may be sold, leased or otherwise provided by a supplier to a consumer.”.
45. In the absence of a hand to hand physical medium there remains confusion on the nature
of digital content which can result in a qualification as a service. In Trib gr inst Nanterre, 6th
Chamber, 15 Decembre 2006, Association UFC Que Choisir v Société Sony France, Société Sony
United Kingdom, Ltd., online, available at http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?
id_article=1816. The supply of downloadable musical recordings through an Internet platform
was qualified by the court as the supply of services under the French Code de la consommation.
Directive 2011/83/EU, supra note 26, pmbl., Recital 19 (treating such copies of copyright works
as neither goods or services). See Séverine Dusollier, Droit d’auteur et protection des oeuvres
dans l’univers numérique 382, 395–96, 399 (2d ed. Bruxelles: Larcier, 2007) (holding that copies
of information products downloaded from the internet cannot be the object of a sale but rather the
provision of a service, conceding however that there is a product involved in the transaction but
that the transmission of the product (the copy) characterizes the whole transaction as the provision
of services). This is the case in the context of the World Trade Organization qualification of such
products as goods or services. Tania Voon, A New Approach to Audiovisual Products in the WTO:
Rebalancing Gatt and Gats, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1., 17–18 (2007) (proposing that in the
context of the World Trade Organization agreements, such products should be treated as services).
Braucher, supra note 40, at 269–70 (noting the artificiality of the distinction between a copy of
software that is preloaded in a physical medium from one that is being downloaded).
46. In a sale of goods context, Statute of Frauds impose that contracts for the sale of goods
above a certain amount be in writing for contracts to be enforceable. For example, the Statute of
Frauds requirements have been codified in the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code. U.S. UCC, supra
note 9, § 2-201. This requirement was abolished in some provinces of Canada (e.g., British
Columbia: Statute Law Amendment Act, SBC 1958, c. 52, § 17). This requirement was abolished
in the United Kingdom by the repeal of section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act of 1893. Law Reform
Enforcement of Contracts Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 11, c. 34, § 21.
47. See Robinson v. Graves, 1 K.B. 579 (Eng. 1935), available at http://www.vanuatu.usp.
ac.fj/courses/LA313_Commercial_Law/Cases/Robinson_v_Graves.html (holding that the
commissioning of a painting by oral agreement, the order of which was later annulled by the
defendant, was a contract for skill and labor and not material). Therefore the statute of frauds rule
by which contracts of a certain value needed to be in writing to be enforceable was not applicable.
It is debatable that this was not a contract for materials.
48. TK Power, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1058 (N.D.C.A. 2006) (where the
court focused on what is the pre- dominant factor in a transaction involving both goods and
services in determining whether the UCC applies to a transaction, which is whether the thrust is
the rendition of service with goods incidentally involved or whether the transaction is a sale of
goods with labor incidentally involved); Horovitz, supra note 23, at 132–33 (explaining the need
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also flows from the combination of goods and services in the same
transaction, in which case courts tend to apply an essential character of
the transaction test49 or substantiality test50 to determine, on a case-bycase basis, whether the commercial transaction is one for goods or
services.51
The distinction between goods and services affects the scope of
protection available to purchasers in sale of goods and consumer law, the
nature of claims52 and the applicable regime of liability. While
information disclosure obligations and protection against unfair
commercial practices typically apply equally to transactions of “goods”
and “services,”53 this is not the case with respect to implied obligations
(e.g., of quality, fitness for purpose, correspondence with description,
title, and quiet possession). In several jurisdictions, the said implied
obligations do not apply to services,54 leaving any applicable claims and

to make the distinction between the labor intensiveness of several information products and the
end results. The distinction between services that are applied to perfect goods from other forms
of services is a helpful distinction in that respect.); see Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v Dharma Sys.,
Inc., 148 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 1998) (showing the need to draw the distinction between the two
forms of labor in a contract involving the supply of customized computer software was made in
the leading case); see also Propulsion Techs., Inc. v. Attwood Corp., 369 F.3d 896 (5th Cir. 2004)
(characterizing the sale of unfinished propeller castings as goods in spite of the contract
contemplating substantial services from supplier).
49. Preload Co. of Can., Ltd. v. City of Regina, 20 D.L.R. (2d) 586, [1959] S.C.R. 801;
Keillian W., Ltd. v. Sportspage Enter., Ltd. (1982), 23 Alta. L.R. (2d) 99, 40 A.R. 586 (Q.B.).
50. See Advent Sys. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Colonial Life
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 817 F. Supp. 235 (D.N.H. 1993); see also Synergistic
Dahlmann v. Sulcus Hospitality Techs., Corp., 63 F. Supp. 2d 772 (E.D. Mich. 1999); see also
ePresence, Inc. v. Evolve Software, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D. Mass. 2002); see also Heidtman
Steel Prods., Inc. v Compuware Corp., F. Supp. 2d, 2000 WL 621144 (N.D. Ohio. 2000).
51. Id.
52. For instance, if the transaction is characterized as one for services, a successful claim
would lie in an actionable tort: for example negligent misrepresentation, or in breach of contract.
53. When such jurisdictions explicitly provide such regimes of protection. For instance,
this is the case under the OCPA. OCPA, supra note 9, sched. A; MCPA, supra note 9, § 58(1);
AFTA, supra note 9, § 1(1)(e); SCPBPA, supra note 12, §§ 6–9. This is also the case of the
European Union. Directive 2011/83/EU, supra note 26; Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April
1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, [1993] O.J. L 95/04 at 29 (seeking to approximate
the laws of the European Union Member States with respect to non-negotiated contracts with
consumers (art. 1)). This is also the case in France under the Code de la Consommation, and in
the United Kingdom pursuant to Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulation 2000—SI
2000/2334 and pursuant to the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999.
54. This is the case under the QCPA, although the statutory warranty of correspondence
with the description applies equally to goods and services. QCPA, supra note 8, art. 40. This is
also the case under: MCPA, supra note 9, § 58(1); AFTA, supra note 9, § 1(1)(e); BCSGA, supra
note 9, § 1(a); SCPBPA, supra note 12, § 44(1) (repealed 2014); NBCPWLA, supra note 9, §
1(1); U.S. UCC, supra note 9 (applying only to goods); Directive 1999/44/EC, supra note 9
(applying only to goods).
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remedies against a defective service to the common law.55 In others, a
different statutory implied obligation applies to services, requiring, for
instance, that the services be deemed to be of a “reasonably acceptable
quality.”56 Implied obligations applicable to goods impose a strict
liability regime where consumers need to prove that goods are not
meeting certain standards (e.g., of quality or fitness for use), while
implied obligations applicable to services apply a fault-based regime
where consumers must prove that the supplier was negligent in how the
services were provided.57 It also affects the nature of remedies available58
and involves evidentiary and statute of limitations considerations.59
Whether information products qualify as goods or services engender
other implications under different legal regimes including tax law and
international trade law.60
In an online environment, the absence of the hand-to-hand supply of
a physical medium, compounded by the blurry line between “goods” and
“services”61 are at the heart of the equivocalness that surrounds the
55. Trollope & Colls, Ltd v. N.W. Metro. Reg’l Hosp. Bd., 1 W.L.R. 601, 609 (1973).
An unexpressed term can be implied if and only if the court finds that the parties
must have intended that term to form part of their contract; it is not enough for
the court to find that such a term would have been adopted by the parties as
reasonable men if it had been suggested to them; it must have been a term that
went without saying, a term which, though tacit, formed part of the contract
which the parties made for themselves.
Id.
56. Statutory implied warranties adapted in the case of the provision of services have been
introduced in some jurisdictions. For example under the OCPA, the implied warranty applicable
to services is that the services are of a “reasonably acceptable quality.” OPCA, supra note 9, §
9(1). See also MCPA, supra note 9, § 58(6) (providing a non-mandatory implied warranty, “that
the services sold shall be provided in a satisfactory manner”); UKSGSA, supra note 10, s. 14(2)(d)
(providing that “supplier will carry out the service with reasonable care and skill.”).
57. See BRADGATE, supra note 12, at 28–29. In the case of services, for example under the
OCPA, the implied warranty applicable to services is that the services are of a “reasonably
acceptable quality.” OCPA, supra note 9.
58. See LOOS ET AL., supra note 7, at 32 (analyzing the laws of 11 countries including the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, and other European states).
59. Consumer protection laws tend to alleviate evidentiary requirements in favor of
consumers. For example, the parole evidence rule often does not apply to consumer contracts. See
generally Horovitz, supra note 23, at 140–43 (showing a U.S. context).
60. See, e.g., Catherine L. Mann, Balancing Issues and Overlapping Jurisdictions in the
Global Electronic Marketplace: The UCITA Example, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 225–26
(2002); Christopher M. Bruner, Culture, Sovereignty, and Hollywood: UNESCO and the Future
of Trade in Cultural Products, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 351 (2008).
61. For a review of Canadian case law characterizing contracts as sale of goods or service
agreements, or a combination of both (i.e., for “work and material”), see GERALD H.L. FRIDMAN,
SALE OF GOODS IN CANADA (5th ed. 2004). See also JACOB S. ZIEGEL & ANTHONY J. DUGGAN,
COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER SALES TRANSACTIONS, CASES, TEXT AND MATERIALS 49–61 (4th
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characterization of information products.
B. Rippling Effects on Sales and Licenses
The presence of a physical object influences the qualification of the
commercial transaction of information products; specifically, whether a
sale or a license took place. The absence of an embedding medium (e.g.,
a CD or a DVD) facilitates a growing commercial practice under which
copyright holders dictate through their contract terms the absence of sale
in the copy of the information product, a practice that is far less common
in the physical hand-to-hand exchange scenarios of books, music CDs, or
film DVDs, which have long been considered as sales of goods. 62 At
times, courts confuse the license granted to consumers to the exclusive
intangible intellectual property rights of the copyright holder, and the
transaction that is taking place with respect to the copy itself.63 One can
surmise that the confusion between the intellectual property rights of the
copyright holder and the personal property rights to the copy of the
information product will only grow bigger when there is no physical
object separating the two.64 The struggles examined so far to characterize
information products as goods, services, or sui generis extends to the
determination of whether the transaction is a sale or a license, leading to
inconsistent outcomes.65
Permuting a sale by a license of the copy of the information product
has important consequences on the rights of recipients of information
products. First, the absence of a “sale” will preclude the application of
sale of goods and consumer protection law statutes to apply in some
ed. 2002). For the European Union and World Trade Organization context, see Smith & Woods,
supra note 43, at 40ff. In the context of the World Trade Organization, the treatment of digital
products distributed online has not been settled and is the object of a work program on electronic
commerce. Electronic Commerce, World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/ecom_e/ecom_e.htm. See also Tania Voon, A New Approach to Audiovisual Products in
the WTO: Rebalancing Gatt and Gats, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2007). The uncertainty of
the proper treatment of these products as goods or services needs to be understood within the
economic, political and legal context proper to the World Trade Organization treatment of goods
and services. Id.
62. The transfer of CDs, DVDs, and cassettes are commonly treated as sales of chattels
movables, unless they are provided under a specific rental agreement. By contrast, the software
industry has for some time adopted the commercial practice to license (and not sell) copies of
software even when they were supplied through the physical transfer of a CD or DVD. Step-Saver
Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 96 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing briefly the historical
context of software licenses).
63. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
64. See discussion infra Part III.B.
65. See discussion supra Part II.A. For a review of the case law and how courts tend to be
more lenient to enforce license to software copies than copies of other types of copyright works,
see Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 2, at 1235–38.
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jurisdictions, leaving any protection to the potential application of other
statutes or to the application of similar implied obligations under the
common law.66 Second, licensing copies of information products rather
than selling them to recipients enables copyright holders to circumvent
the application of exceptions to copyright infringement, the rationale for
such licensing practices being well known and documented.67 Whether
an information product is sold or licensed determines recipients’ ability
to perform certain acts without the authorization of copyright holders
such as: benefiting from the first sale doctrine68 or the computer programs
exemptions.69 Recipients of information products are authorized to
perform those acts without copyright holders’ authorization on copies
that that they own, not when the copies of information products are
licensed.
Courts have taken different approaches to decide whether a sale or a
license of the information product took place, in the context of
determining whether the recipient of the information product would
benefit from the relevant exception to copyright infringement (i.e., those
exceptions requiring that a sale or transfer of the copy of the information
product take place to apply). The approaches vary between deferring in
large part to how copyright holders characterize the transaction (i.e., it is
a license because right holder stated it as such in the agreement) to
looking at the substance and economic characteristics of the transaction,
regardless of how the transaction is designated by the right holder.70 In
the United States, the leading decision is the Ninth Circuit Court of
66. In some jurisdictions, the requirement of the sale of a good is relevant to the application
of implied obligations (e.g., quality, fitness for purpose, title and quiet possession). It is generally
not relevant for the application of information disclosure requirements and for the application of
provisions prohibiting unfair terms. See supra Part II.A. In the United Kingdom, while the implied
obligations under the UKSGA (supra note 9) would not apply in the absence of a sale, the implied
obligations of the UKSGSA. UKSGSA, supra note 10, c. 29 (showing it may apply if the
transaction falls within the scope of this Act). See, e.g., SAM Bus. Sys., Ltd. v. Hedley & Co.,
[2002] EWHC 2733 (TCC) (Eng.); Jonathan Wren & Co., Ltd. v. Microdec PLC, 1999 WL
1953326 (1999) (Eng.) (holding UKSGSA applied to computer systems).
67. The practice is well-recognized and particularly prevailing with respect to copies of
computer programs. See Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements do not Control Copy
Ownership: First Sales and Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887 (2010); Perzanowski
& Schultz, supra note 2, at 1242–46.
68. See discussion infra Part II.C.
69. See, e.g., Canada’s Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, §§ 30.6, 30.61 [hereinafter
CCA]; 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1). In the European Union, exceptions to copyright infringement
applicable to computer programs are governed by the European Council. Council and Parliament
Directive 2009/24/EC of 23 April 2009 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, [2009]
O.J. L 111/16 [hereinafter Directive 2009/24/EC].
70. See Carver, supra note 67, at 1898–923.On a case law analysis of how courts take
different approaches to determine the nature of the legal transaction as sale or license in cases
involving software versus other cases, see Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 2, at 1925-31.
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Appeals judgment Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.,71 reflecting the first
approach. In that judgment, the court gave more weight to the terms used
by software licensor than in previous judgments that focused more on the
substance of the transaction.72 The court held that the applicable test to
determine the nature of the transaction was: “whether the copyright
owner specifies that a user is granted a license. Second, we consider
whether the copyright owner significantly restricts the user’s ability to
transfer the software. Finally, we consider whether the copyright owner
imposes notable use restrictions.”73 In the European Union, the judgment
by the Court of Justice of the European Union, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle
International Corp,74 is illustrative of the second approach, focusing on
the substance of the transaction. In that case, the court had to assess
whether a sale of the software copies of Oracle International Corp to
71. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
72. A good illustration of how courts have qualified the transaction, regardless of suppliers
labeling the contract as a license is Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075,
1086 (C.D. Cal. 2001):
[T]he following factors require a finding that distributing software under licenses
transfers individual copy ownership: temporally unlimited possession, absence
of time limits on copy possession, pricing and payment schemes that are unitary
not serial, licenses under which subsequent transfer is neither prohibited nor
conditioned on obtaining the licensor’s prior approval (only subject to a
prohibition against rental and a requirement that any transfer be of the entity),
and licenses under which the use restrictions’ principal purpose is to protect
intangible copyrightable subject matter, and not to preserve property interests in
individual program copies.
The Court relied on the comments made by Professor Nimmer:
Ownership of a copy should be determined based on the actual character, rather
than the label, of the transaction by which the user obtained possession. Merely
labeling a transaction as a lease or license does not control. If a transaction
involves a single payment giving the buyer an unlimited period in which it has a
right to possession, the transaction is a sale. In this situation, the buyer owns the
copy regardless of the label the parties use for the contract. Course of dealing
and trade usage may be relevant, since they establish the expectations and intent
of the parties. The pertinent issue is whether, as in a lease, the user may be
required to return the copy to the vendor after the expiration of a particular
period. If not, the transaction conveyed not only possession, but also transferred
ownership of the copy.
Id. On the distinction between sales and licenses under U.S. copyright law, see also F.B.T. Prods.
v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010). See also test to establish ownership in copies
regarding rights of copy owners of computer programs to make limited modifications under 17
U.S.C. § 117(a)(1); Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2005); ZilYen, Inc., v. Rubber
Mfrs. Ass’n, 935 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D.D.C. 2013).
73. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110–11.
74. Case C-128/11, Usedsoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. at 10.
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UsedSoft had taken place to decide whether the exclusive distribution
right of Oracle International Corp on the copies of his computer programs
had been exhausted.75 The court noted that the download of the copy of
the computer program combined with the conclusion of a user license
constituted a whole for the purpose of their legal classification.76 The
Court relied on two components of the commercial transaction to
conclude that there was a transfer of ownership of the copy downloaded
from the Internet: the payment of a one-time fee and the fact that the user
was allowed to use the copy for an indefinite period of time. 77 The court
reasoned that “sale” needed to be given a broad interpretation and its
presence assessed based on the substance of the transaction, otherwise
suppliers could easily circumvent the principle of exhaustion.78
The practice to license the copy of the information product rather than
selling it begs the important questions: what rights does the recipient of
the information product precisely have and what rights does the supplier
retain in the copy? Where does the personal property in the copy lie in all
this and does it make any sense?79 The practice of licensing and not
selling the copy of an information product for an indefinite period of time,
often in exchange for a one-time fee may be deceiving. Such licensing
practices may easily create a false perception of ownership or quasi
ownership, but for an important limitation: often, the recipient of the copy
75. Id. The court was seized with a reference to a preliminary ruling by the
Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), that involved the question of whether exhaustion of the
distribution right in article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24/EC, applied to a lawful acquirer who had
made the copy by downloading the computer program from the Internet to a data carrier. Directive
2009/24/EC, supra note 69, art. 4(2).
76. Case C-128/11, ¶¶ 44–49.
77. Id. ¶ 45.
78. Id. ¶ 49, the court referring to the opinion of Advocate General Y. Bot:
if the term “sale” within the meaning of Article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24 were
not given a broad interpretation as encompassing all forms of product marketing
characterised by the grant of a right to use a copy of a computer program, for an
unlimited period, in return for payment of a fee designed to enable the copyright
holder to obtain a remuneration corresponding to the economic value of the copy
of the work of which he is the proprietor, the effectiveness of that provision
would be undermined, since suppliers would merely have to call the contract a
“license” rather than a “sale” in order to circumvent the rule of exhaustion and
divest it of all scope.
79. See Carver, supra note 67, at 1896–97 (pointing to the practice of suppliers licensing
goods, retaining personal property ownership, but with a permanent transfer of possession as
unprecedented and incoherent). Juliet M. Moringiello, What Virtual Worlds can do for Property
Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 159, at 191–96 (2010) (questioning the increasing practice to license copies
rather than selling them in the context of virtual worlds, noting that traditionally in property law,
licenses have not been granting a possessory interest but have been used to grant a permission
(e.g., to certain uses of reserved intellectual property rights, or to limited access to land)).
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does not have the right to transfer it to a third party. 80
Questions on the nature and enforceability of the legal transaction in
the commercialization of information products are not trivial: they
determine the balance of power between supplier and recipient of the
information product. The preferred methods of commercialization of
information products raise questions that relate to the legitimacy of the
progressive expansion of intellectual property rights in recent years.81
They involve evaluating right holders’ commercial practices (often
through non-negotiated standard-form agreements) in relation to the
underlying objectives of copyright and the delicate balance that it needs
to maintain among the competing interests of right holders, authors and
users. For instance, should we allow right holders to circumvent
exceptions to copyright infringement, also referred to as user rights,
through their commercial practices, and if so, under what rationale and
parameters?82 At a more basic level, the sale versus licensing of an
information product determines whether the recipient owns the copy of
the information product with all prima facie open-ended powers and
privilege (including of transfer), that come with ownership, against the
world (in rem), or if the recipient has a limited contractual right to use the
information product (in personam) with no power of transfer, or if the
recipient’s entitlements to the information products lie somewhere in the
middle.
C. First Sale or Exhaustion Doctrine
The reluctance to apply the first sale doctrine to information products
distributed online is another important manifestation of the dividing line
that tangibility (or the lack thereof) creates in the regulation of
80. See Pascale Chapdelaine, The Ambiguous Nature of Copyright Users’ Rights, 26
INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 26–28 (2013). At times suppliers of information products refer to words such
as purchase and ownership concurrently with language suggesting that recipients do not own the
copies that are made available to them.
81. Copyright has not ceased expanding during the last century in duration, in subject
matter, and in scope, in Canada, the United States and worldwide. In Canada, the latest
amendments to the CCA came into force with the Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20,
to comply with Canada’s international obligations under the World Intellectual Property
Organization Internet Treaties of 1996 [WIPO Internet Treaties]. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec.
20, 1996, WO033EN, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html#
P8_189 [hereinafter WCT]; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996,
WO034EN,
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html
[hereinafter WPPT]. The main purpose of the treaties is to address “the profound impact of the
development and convergence of information and communication technologies on the creation
and use of literary and artistic works.” WCT, supra, pmbl.
82. For a discussion on whether exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory, see
Chapdelaine, supra note 80, at 37–43; see also MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 168–70 (2013).
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information products. The exhaustion or first sale doctrine83 is the rule
stipulating that once the first sale of physical objects embodying
copyright works (such as a book, DVD, or a music CD) has occurred with
the authorization of the copyright holder, the copyright holder cannot
dictate the fate of subsequent transfers of that object.84 The first sale or
exhaustion doctrine restricts copyright holders’ exclusive distribution
rights and does not apply to other exclusive rights (e.g., the right to
reproduce the work or to communicate the work to the public by
telecommunication).85 In essence, the exhaustion or first sale doctrine
allows owners of copies of information products to exercise one of the
basic powers and privileges of ownership (i.e., to transfer their rights in
the copies to another party). The first sale or exhaustion doctrine is one
among other exceptions to copyright infringement wherein the presence
of a physical object plays a determinant role on their applicability.86
Only lawful owners of copies of information products can invoke the
exhaustion or first sale doctrine; licensees, borrowers or people who
otherwise access copies of information products cannot.87 The prevailing
commercial practice to license copies of information products rather than
sell copies outright allows copyright holders to avoid the application of
the first sale or exhaustion doctrine and to retain control over secondary
markets of the information products that they commercialize.88
Therefore, the diverging approaches adopted by courts in determining
whether a sale or license took place have important ramifications on the
application of the first sale or exhaustion doctrine.89
The prevailing view is that the exclusive right of distribution and its
83. The doctrine is known as the first sale doctrine in the United States and as the principle
of exhaustion in other jurisdictions.
84. At the copyright international law level, see WCT, supra note 81, art. 6; WPPT, supra
note 81, art. 8. In Canada, the exclusive distribution right and its exhaustion were introduced in
2012 by the Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20 [hereinafter CMA], which amended
the CCA, supra note 71, §§ 3, 15, 18. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (a); see also U.S. Copyright Office, A
Report of the Register of Copyrights Pursuant to Section 104 of the DMCA, at 22–23 (2001),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca_study.html [hereinafter
DMCA 2001 Report].
85. DMCA 2001 Report, supra note 84, at 79–80.
86. Other exceptions to copyright infringement require a sale or other transfer of the copy
of the information product for the exception to apply (e.g., with respect to computer programs).
See CCA, supra note 69, §§ 30.6, 30.61; 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1); Directive 2009/24/EC, supra note
69. This requirement tends to favor information products embedded into physical objects over
copies distributed online with no physical embedding medium.
87. At the copyright international law level, see WCT, supra note 81, art. 6; WPPT, supra
note 81, art. 8. In Canada, the exclusive distribution right and its exhaustion were introduced in
2012 by the CMA. CMA, supra note 84 (amending the CCA, supra note 69, §§ 3, 15, 18). See 17
U.S.C. § 109 (a); see also DMCA 2001 Report, supra note 84, at 22–23.
88. See discussion supra Part II.B.
89. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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exhaustion only apply with respect to copyright works embedded in
physical tangible objects and does not apply to digital copies of
information products made available to recipients with no supporting
physical medium exchanged from hand to hand. Article 6 of WCT and
article 8 of WPPT impose on their member states the substantive minima
to confer an exclusive distribution right to copyright holders for their
literary and artistic works (or of their performances fixed in phonograms
in the case of WPPT) (i.e., to authorize “the making available to the
public of the original and copies of their works through sale or other
transfer of ownership.”).90 They leave it up to member states to determine
the application of exhaustion “after the first sale or other transfer of
ownership of the original or a copy of the work with the authorization of
the author.”91 The agreed statement concerning these articles specifies
that the copies that are subject to the right of distribution refer exclusively
to “fixed copies that can be put into circulation as tangible objects.”92 On
that basis, commentators argue that the effect of WCT and WPPT is to
exclude the application of the exhaustion of the distribution right to
digital copies of information products distributed online.93 The
implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties or existing law of Member
States, including Canada,94 the United States,95 and the European

90. WCT, supra note 81, art. 6; WPPT, supra note 81, art. 8.
91. WCT, supra note 81, art. 6; WPPT, supra note 81, art. 8.
92. WCT, supra note 81 (agreed statements concerning arts. 6 & 7).
93. See André Lucas, International Exhaustion, in GLOBAL COPYRIGHT THREE HUNDRED
YEARS SINCE THE STATUTE OF ANNE, FROM 1709 TO CYBERSPACE 304, 309ff (Lionel Bently et al.
eds., 2010) [hereinafter GLOBAL COPYRIGHT]. The author argues that WCT, art. 6, read in
conjunction with art. 8, closed the path to the application of an immaterial exhaustion principle.
See also PIERRE-EMMANUEL MOYSE, LE DROIT DE DISTRIBUTION: ANALYSE HISTORIQUE ET
COMPARATIVE EN DROIT D’AUTEUR 559–62 (Cowansville, Québec: Les Editions Yvon Blais 2007).
94. CMA introduced the exclusive distribution right and the principle of exhaustion in the
CCA. CCA sections 3, 15 & 18 refer to work (or other subject matter of copyright) “that is in the
form of a tangible object.” CCA, supra note 69, §§ 3, 15, 18.
95. See Marybeth Peters, The Legal Perspective on Exhaustion in the Borderless Era:
Consideration of a Digital First Sale Doctrine for Online Transmissions of Digital Works in the
United States, in GLOBAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 93 (citing the DMCA 2001 Report, supra note
84, at 80, 97); see also Capitol Records LLC v ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y.,
2013).
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Union,96 tends to confirm that interpretation.97
Two recent judgments, UsedSoft98 by the E.U. Court of Justice
[UsedSoft], and Capitol Records LLC v ReDigi, Inc.,99 by the South
District Court of New York, [ReDigi], have taken very different
approaches in determining whether the first sale or exhaustion doctrine
applied to information products distributed online. In UsedSoft, the Court
of Justice of the European Union was faced with a preliminary ruling by
the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) that involved the question of whether
exhaustion of the distribution right in article 4(2) of Directive
2009/24/EC applied to a lawful acquirer who had made the copy by
downloading the computer program from the Internet to a data carrier.100
The outcome of that question was of significant importance to Oracle
who at the time distributed 85% of its computer programs through
Internet downloads.101 Article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24/EC provides:
“The first sale in the Community of a copy of a program by the
rightholder or with his consent shall exhaust the distribution right within
the Community of that copy . . .”102 The Court pointed to various possible
interpretations of article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24/EC that revolved
around the question of whether there was a need to put the computer
96. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001
on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information
Society, [2001] O.J., L 167/10 [hereinafter Directive 2001/29/EC]. The conclusion is made from
the application of art. 4.2 in conjunction with recitals 28 and 29, pmbl. See Lucas, supra note 93,
in GLOBAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 97, at 309ff; Tomasz Targosz, Exhaustion in Digital Products
and the ‘Accidental’ Impact on the Balance of Interests in Copyright Law, in GLOBAL COPYRIGHT,
supra note 93, at 337; Séverine Dusollier, The Relations Between Copyright Law and Consumers’
Rights from a European Perspective, EUR. PARLIAMENT PUB., Nov. 10, 2010, at 26–27. But see
European Union, Opinion Advocate General Bot, Case C-128/11, Axel W. Bierbach,
administrator of UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp., 24 Apr. 2012, ¶¶ 75–76 (raising
doubts as to whether Directive 2001/29/EC limits the distribution right and its exhaustion to
copyright works embodied in physical objects). See also Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v.
Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. at 10 (holding that exhaustion applied to digital copies of
computer programs are not embedded in a physical object). See Art & Allposters Int’l BV v.
Stichting Pictoright, C.J.E.U. (2015) (interpreting the distribution right under Directive
2001/29/EC ¶¶ 29–39).
97. In particular, the implementation by the European Union goes one step further than the
WCT and WPPT, in emphasizing the need for the transfer of a tangible object embedding the
copyright work for the rule of exhaustion to apply. See Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 96.
98. See Case C-128/11, Usedsoft, 2012 E.C.R. The Court had to determine whether the
transfer of ownership (sale) of the copy of the computer program had taken place or not and is a
requirement of the application of exhaustion.
99. See Capitol Records LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
100. See Case C-128/11, Usedsoft, 2012 E.C.R. ¶ 4.
101. See id. ¶ 21. If copyright exhaustion did not apply to such copies, then Oracle would
retain control on future transfers of the copies. If exhaustion applied, Oracle would lose control
on the secondary markets of its computer programs.
102. See id. ¶ 17.
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program in circulation in a physical medium exchanged hand-to-hand for
the exhaustion of distribution rights to apply.103 The Court found that the
exhaustion of the distribution right in article 4(2) of Directive
2009/24/EC applied regardless of whether the right holder put the copies
of computer programs in circulation with a physical supporting medium
exchanged hand-to-hand.104 The Court emphasized that for the doctrine
of exhaustion to apply, the original acquirer reselling his copy of the
computer software must make his own copy unusable; to allow otherwise
would amount to an unauthorized reproduction, which the exhaustion
doctrine would not cover.105
The Court reiterated the lex specialis character of Directive
2009/24/EC as regulating the protection of computer programs in relation
to the broader framework of copyright protection in Directive
2001/29/EC.106 For the time being, the holding of the UsedSoft judgment
may not have ramifications beyond the specific case of computer
programs distributed online. The Court neither sought to explain why
there should be a different treatment for computer programs from that of
other copyright works, nor did it have to decide whether the same
conclusion could be made in respect of Directive 2001/29/EC under
which the exhaustion doctrine is likely to require a sale of a physical
embodiment to apply.107 The UsedSoft judgment leads to the odd result
of a different application of the distribution right and exhaustion rule to
computer programs than to other copyright works for no apparent reason.
In ReDigi, Capitol Records, an established record label company,
alleged that ReDigi’s platform and services, in particular its users’ resale
of digital music files, amounted to copyright infringement.108 The
relevant issues before the court were whether ReDigi’s resale services
involved an unauthorized reproduction of digital music files, whether
103. Id. ¶ 32. The various interpretations are based on different applications of Article 4(2)
of Directive 2009/24/EC and Directive 2001/29/EC. Directive 2009/24/EC, supra note 69;
Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 96, recitals 28 & 29, pmbl.; id. art. 4 (being read in conjunction
with Article 8 of WCT and the agreed statement concerning Articles 6 and 7 of WCT, the
implementation of which forms part of the objectives of Directive 2001/29/EC).
104. Case C-128/11, Usedsoft, 2012 E.C.R. ¶ 53ff.
105. Id. ¶ 70. This is a corollary of the fact that the exhaustion doctrine only applies to the
distribution right and not to other acts reserved to copyright holders.
106. Id. ¶ 56.
107. See id. ¶ 60 (stating that Directive 2009/24/EC could be interpreted independently from
Directive 2001/29/EC, given the clear intent expressed by the European Union legislature in
article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24/EC to apply to all copies of computer programs (tangible and
intangible)). The Court did not explain the relationship and compliance of Directive 2009/24/EC
with WCT, article 6 which has been interpreted as applying only to the distribution of copyright
works involving the transfer of a tangible object. See Art & Allposters Int’l BV v. Stichting
Pictoright, C.J.E.U. (2015) (interpreting the distribution right under Directive 2001/29/EC ¶¶ 29–
39).
108. Capitol Records LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 644–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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there was an unauthorized distribution by Redigi of the music files and
whether the first sale doctrine applied.109 The court held that the resale
services involved unauthorized distributions and reproductions of music
files and that the latter were not covered by the first sale doctrine which
does not exhaust any other rights than the distribution right.110 Therefore,
ReDigi infringed the copyright of Capitol Records.111 The court rejected
ReDigi’s argument that at the end of each migration of the music files,
the system ensured that there was only one copy of the relevant music
files remaining.112 In doing so, and unlike the E.U. Court of Justice in
UsedSoft, the Court applied the first sale doctrine restrictively and based
on a literal meaning of the act of reproduction rather than taking a
functional and purposive approach.113
The different approaches taken in UsedSoft and ReDigi reflect other
aspects of the tangible versus intangible property divide. While the
technical approach by ReDigi is an attempt to replicate in the digital
online world what occurs in the world of physical objects, UsedSoft’s
approach reflects an adaptation to the online world that seeks to bridge
the differences between the offline and online world, by looking at the
function and purpose of the transaction at hand and of the first sale or
exhaustion doctrine.
The non-application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine to digital
copies of information products distributed online reflects a copyright
holder-centric view of copyright that favors its expansion at the expense
of information product recipients’ rights.114 The non-application of
109. Id.
110. Id. at 661.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 651.
113. Id. at 650. “Simply put, it is the creation of a new material object and not an additional
material object that defines the reproduction right.” The dictionary defines “reproduction” to
mean, inter alia, “to produce again” or “to cause to exist again or anew.” See MERRIAM–WEBSTER
COLLEGIATE EDITION 994 (10th ed. 1998) (emphasis added). Significantly, it is not defined as “to
produce again while the original exists.” Thus, the right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in
. . . phonorecords” is implicated whenever a sound recording is fixed in a new material object,
regardless of whether the sound recording remains fixed in the original material object.”
114. Peters, as former U.S. Register of Copyrights at the U.S. Copyright Office (citing
DMCA 2001 Report, supra note 84, at 82–83, 89):
The Copyright Office recommendation was based on interrelated economic and
practical considerations. One concern was the impact of a digital first sale
doctrine on the ability of right holders to exploit their works. Works in digital
format can be reproduced without any degradation in quality and transmitted
rapidly with little cost. Thus digital transmissions, and the ease of pirating perfect
copies, are likely to affect adversely the market for copies of a work to a greater
degree than transfers of physical copies.
GLOBAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 93, at 331; DMCA 2001 Report, supra note 84, at 100–01
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digital exhaustion limits the scope of the first sale doctrine significantly
in light of this increasingly prevalent method of distribution of copies of
information products. The limited scope of application of the exhaustion
or first sale doctrine raises the following questions: what is the rationale
for why the exclusive distribution right requires a physical object be
exchanged hand-to-hand so that exhaustion may apply, and is it
justifiable?115
D. Exclusive Copyright Acts Involved in the Commercialization of
Information Products
How we define information products and the commercial transactions
involved have an impact on the exclusive rights of copyright holders as
they make their works available online. Whether a consumer downloads
an information product protected by copyright or streams it implicates
varying rights of copyright holders.116 Does it involve a communication
to the public, a distribution, or a reproduction of the work protected by
copyright? Each separate reserved act performed without the
authorization of copyright holders may constitute copyright
infringement.117 Moreover, when collective management of copyright is
involved, separate compensation mechanisms arise for the benefit of right
holders. The determination of the reserved copyright act involved when
information products are made available to recipients has important
financial consequences for copyright holders, distributors of information
products, other intermediaries, and ultimately the recipients

(considering briefly the reasonable expectations of consumers with respect to digital copies as an
argument to support the application of the first sale doctrine to digital copies of copyright works
distributed online but dismissed it expeditiously, giving way to the threat that its application would
represent to the exclusive rights of copyright holders).
115. See infra Part III.
116. Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada,
[2012] S.C.R 34 (Can.) ¶ 28, where the Supreme Court made the distinction between downloading
and streaming as follows:
Although a download and a stream are both “transmissions” in technical terms
(they both use “data packet technology”), they are not both “communications”
for purposes of the Copyright Act. This is clear from the Board’s definition of a
stream as “a transmission of data that allows the user to listen or view the content
at the time of transmission and that is not meant to be reproduced” (para 15).
Unlike a download, the experience of a stream is much more akin to a broadcast
or performance.
The Court held that the online delivery of a permanent copy of a video game did not amount to a
“communication” under CCA, s. 3(1)(f). Id. ¶ 43.
117. Id. ¶ 41.
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themselves.118
Two recent judgments, one by the Supreme Court of Canada, the other
UsedSoft, from E.U. Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), illustrate the link
between the characterization of the information product and the
commercial transaction taking place online while assessing the reserved
copyright acts that are involved. In Entertainment Software
Association,119 the Supreme Court of Canada had to decide whether
downloading video games through the Internet amounts to a
communication to the public via the musical works the games contain,
thereby qualifying as the object of a separate tariff.120 In a five-to-four
decision, the Court held that this act involved no act of communication
to the public and could not trigger the application of a separate tariff.121
Abella and Moldaver JJ. for the majority, defined the act of downloading
copies of information products as follows:
In our view, there is no practical difference between buying a
durable copy of the work in a store, receiving a copy in the mail,
or downloading an identical copy using the Internet. The Internet
is simply a technological taxi that delivers a durable copy of the
same work to the end user.122
The treatment by the Court majority of various forms of copies of
copyright works and methods of delivery as one and the same
phenomenon with regard to infringement is pertinent in at least two
respects. First, the court majority singled out the presence of an individual
consumer copy of the information product, capable of delivery, and
assimilated it to a copy embedded in a physical object. Second, the
majority of the Supreme Court based its reasoning on the principle of
technological neutrality, finding a functional equivalent between the
online delivery of the copy of a computer program and the supply of a
material medium.123 In doing so, the Court majority focused its attention
on the essence and substance of the copy of an information product rather
118. For example, when copyright is administered by collectively, each reserved copyright
act may be subject to a tariff or other compensation scheme. In Canada, the collective management
of copyright is overseen by the Copyright Board which approves tariffs. CCA, supra note 69, §§
66–76.
119. Entm’t Software Ass’n, [2012] S.C.R 34 (Can.) ¶ 28.
120. Id. In that case, the tariff in question had been submitted by SOCAN to the Canadian
Copyright Board for approval.
121. Id. ¶ 5.
122. Id.
123. Id. ¶¶ 5–9. For a discussion on technological neutrality and the Entertainment Software
Association judgment, see Carys J. Craig, Technological Neutrality: (Pre)Serving the Purposes
of Copyright Law, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY, HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA SHOOK
THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 271, 289–91 (Michael Geist ed., 2013).
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than its form.
In UsedSoft, the E.U. Court of Justice made an interesting observation
on the co-existence of the distribution and the communication of a work
to the public.124 The Court interpreted the transfer of ownership of a copy
as transforming an act of communication to the public into a distribution
under which, if the conditions were present, exhaustion would apply.125
This is consistent with the Court’s determination of an online
transmission as “the functional equivalent of the supply of a material
medium.”126 The Court pointed to the essence of distribution (which
typically involves the transfer of an original or copy of a copyright work)
by contrast to a communication presented to the public (which involves
a service, the consumption of which always necessitates the intervention
of a third party). Both in UsedSoft (through the principle of functional
equivalent) and Entertainment Software Association (through the
principle of technological neutrality) the distribution act and the
communication to the public act were viewed as mutually exclusive.
While the Supreme Court rejection of the presence of the communication
to the public in the online purchase of a video game may not hold in light
of the subsequent entry into force of section 2.4 (1.1) of Canada’s
Copyright Act,127 the Court’s majority treatment in Entertainment
Software Association of online copies of copyright works distributed
online remains relevant to the discussion on the (in)determinacy of
physical objects in the regulation of information products.
III. CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE REQUIREMENT OF A
PHYSICAL OBJECT
Let us take a closer look at some of the causes that may explain the
current tangible and intangible property divide with respect to
information products. The purpose of the exercise is to show why the
emphasis on a physical object is largely unjustified and how it leads to
inconsistent and arbitrary results. The first part of the analysis considers
two noticeable trends of how courts, legislatures and commentators
characterize information products that result from a misconception of the
properties involved in information products. The second part of the
analysis explores the role that prevailing commercial practices play in
shaping the tangible and intangible property divide of information
products, particularly through non-negotiated standard form agreements.
124.
125.
126.
127.
7, 2012.

Case C-128/11, Usedsoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 E.C.R ¶ 52.
Id.
Id. ¶ 61.
CMA, which amended CCA, by the introduction of s. 2.4 (1.1), entered into force Nov.
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The third part of the analysis assesses the negative consequences of such
trends to recipients’ rights to information products in terms of how these
rights are degraded as well as the resulting double standards and
consequent legal and normative incoherence.
A. Misconceptions of Properties
1. The Meaning of “Tangible Property”
That the presence of a physical object determines whether an
information product is a good or the doctrine of first sale applies reflects
a misconception of the division between tangible and intangible property.
In the case of information products made available online with no
supporting physical objects, one could be tempted to conclude that they
are intangible property by relying on the ordinary meaning of tangible
(i.e., something “capable of being perceived especially by the sense of
touch”).128 Some courts have stated that a physical object needed to be
present for information products to qualify as goods.129 The qualification
is important because intangible property (or choses in action) is often
excluded from the application of sale of goods and consumer protection
law.130 The contrast between tangible and intangible property is stark in
many other areas of the law: the tort of conversion and the common law
possessory lien have been held to apply solely with respect to tangible
property (choses in possession).131 In an increasingly immaterial world,
the function of the distinction between tangible and intangible property
may have become lost in translation.132
A closer look at how “tangible property” and “intangible property”
have been traditionally defined at common law and the reason for the
exclusion of intangible property under sale of goods law indicate that the
lack of a physical object should not be a relevant criterion per se to
exclude information products from being tangible property and goods by
extension. By the same token, the lack of a physical object should not be
128. CANADIAN OXFORD DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2004), available at http://www.oxford
reference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195418163.001.0001/m-en_ca-msdict-00001-0069617?
rskey=OrCWPZ&result=1 (defining “tangible” as “perceptible by touch; having material form
. . . .”). Tangible originates from the latin “tangere[,]” which means touch. Id.
129. See discussion supra Part II.A.
130. See discussion supra Part II.A.
131. For the tort conversion, see OBG, Ltd. v. Allan, [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 A.C. 1
(Eng.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldjudgmt/jd070502/
obg.pdf. For the common law lien, see Your Response, Ltd. v. Datateam Bus. Media, Ltd., [2014]
EWCA (Civ.) 281 (Eng.) ¶ 34.
132. See Juliet M. Moringiello, False Categories in Commercial Law: The (Ir)Relevance of
(In)Tangibility, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119, 122 (2007) (discussing the false categories that arise
from the tangible versus intangible property dichotomy); GREEN & RANDALL, supra note 4, at 131.
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determinant to the application of the first sale or exhaustion doctrine in
copyright law. Personal property (“chattels personal”) is subdivided
between “choses in possession” and “choses in action.”
Choses in possession are generally associated with “tangible
property” (i.e., those, “unfixed movables perceptible by the senses and
thus capable of actual physical possession,”133) or “corporeal things,
tangible, movable and visible[;] they are always in the possession of
someone.”134 In contrast, “choses in action” are generally associated with
“intangible property” and are often negatively defined as “embracing all
forms of property not involving actual possession or right of possession
as a necessary incident . . . .”135 Choses in action include debt, liquidated
damages, promissory notes, shares, and copyright.136 “Choses in action”
originally referred to a tangible article which was in the possession of
someone other than the owner: to recover it, the owner had to take an
action at law, and later evolved to encompass “intangible rights existing
only in contemplation of the mind, . . . all invisible and incorporeal
rights.”137
The key distinguishing factor between tangible and intangible
property revolves around the ability to physically possess and exercise
control over the resource with respect to tangible property (choses in
possession). For intangible property (or choses in action) court
intervention is generally necessary for the owner to exercise power and
control over her resource. Courts have been reluctant to recognize that
one could exercise physical possession over an information product that
was not embedded in a physical object. In Your Response, Ltd. v
Datateam Business Media, Ltd.,138 Moore-Bick LJ, for the Court of
Appeal of England and Wales held that the claimant data manager was
barred to exercise a common law lien over a database owned by the
defendant for unpaid services, as the data manager did not have physical
possession over the database.139 For the court, “possession is concerned
with the physical control of tangible objects,” and although the data
manager exercised “practical control” over the database, he could not
exercise physical possession over information because it is intangible.140
The evidence relating to the data manager’s actual and exercised physical
133. W.H. HASTINGS KELKE, AN EPITOME OF PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW 2 (3d ed. 1910).
134. CROSSLEY VAINES, PERSONAL PROPERTY 11 (5th ed. 1973).
135. KELKE, supra note 133, at 2. Vaines defines choses in action as “all rights and
incorporeal things not being chattels real or choses in possession.” VAINES, supra note 134, at 11.
136. KELKE, supra note 133, at 5–6.
137. FRANK HALL CHILDS, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 54 (1914).
138. Your Response, Ltd., [2014] EWCA (Civ.) 281, ¶¶ 22–23, (Eng.). Davis L.J. & Floyd
L.J. concurred with Moore-Bick L.J.’s judgment. Id. ¶¶ 37, 41.
139. Id. ¶¶ 22–23.
140. Id.
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control of the database did not satisfy the court.141 Unfortunately, the
court of appeal missed an opportunity to take a functional and
technologically neutral approach to new shapes of property interests like
the one in the case at hand (an online database). In general, with respect
to information products delivered online, the fact that recipients are able
to access their copy on a permanent basis and to store it on devices that
they own or have restricted control over should satisfy the requirement of
physical possession, just as it is satisfied with copies of audio CDs, film
DVDs, or paper books.142 The movability and control over access to the
copy of the information product at the exclusion of others are important
attributes of physical control and possession.143
Tangible property (choses in possession) in contrast with intangible
property (choses in action) is perhaps best understood as things that are
physical or concrete versus those that are conceptual or abstract. As one
is capable of physically possessing the copy of an information product
downloaded to a computer (e.g., a musical recording, e-book, film), the
copy is not conceptual but is indeed concrete and physical.144 Such a copy
therefore better fits the definition of tangible property (choses in
possession) than intangible property (choses in action).
The exclusion of intangible property from sale of goods law is
comprehensible when looking at its purpose and scope, which is to
regulate the trade between sellers and buyers, dealing with such concerns
as methods of delivery and acceptance, perishable goods, implied
warranties of quality, fitness for purpose, title and quiet possession.145
Many of these considerations are largely irrelevant to choses in action as
debts, liquidated damages, promissory notes, and copyright. By contrast,
the preoccupations addressed in sale of goods law are highly relevant to
copies of information products downloaded from the Internet. When was
the information product delivered and accepted by the recipient? What
implied warranties are attached to the information product? What are the
remedies available to the recipient should there be a breach of contract?
The rationale for the exclusion of intangible property or choses in action
141. Id.
142. See Digital Products: E.U. Consumers Need Clear Rights, European Consumer
Organisation, BEUC position paper, (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.beuc.org/publications/201200832-01-e.pdf (arguing that digital products fulfilling these criteria should be treated as “goods”
under relevant legislation).
143. For a discussion on how digital assets may fulfill the requirements of possession in the
context of the tort of conversion, see GREEN & RANDALL, supra note 4, at 118–20 (referring to
excludability and movability, excludability and restricted access, and exhaustibility of the digital
asset as being the relevant factors).
144. Id. (discussing, for example, how the physicality of computer software is apparent from
how it changes the hardware capacity once the computer software is stored on it, in the context of
the eligibility of digital assets to the tort of conversion).
145. See generally OSGA, supra note 9, § 1 (defining terms addressed in the Act).
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does not apply to these types of information products. Adopting a
purposive approach to the U.S. UCC to assess the nature of computer
software, one commentator observed that the concerns for excluding
intangibles such as “choses in action” from the definition of goods in the
U.S. UCC are not present in the context of computer software:146 “while
the UCC does distinguish between goods and things in action, excluding
the latter from coverage, software, no matter how it is classified, should
not fall within this exclusion. . . . It is unlike intangible legal rights,
intangible laws and principles, and intangible assets.”147 Looking closer
at how property law defines personal tangible property (choses in
possession) and personal intangible property (choses in action), as well
as the reasons underlying the exclusion of intangible property from sale
of goods law, the requirement of a physical object to characterize an
information product as a good is unwarranted and unjustified.
There is no requirement of tangibility (understood in the narrow
sense) in the definition of “goods,” as something that is perceptible by
touch.148 The physical, concrete, and defined nature of information
products like software, musical recordings, and e-books should be
guiding factors in qualifying them as full-fledged goods conferred with
more than the mere conceptual right to sue for their protection (as
opposed to the conception of a debt or intellectual property). While they
cannot be touched, and in some cases not seen, the pixels and binary
codes that make up the musical recording or the film are as “physical” as
the CDs or DVDs that support a digital copy.149 Ultimately, whether a
specific information product constitutes a good, service, or both, or is of
a sui generis nature, requires further analysis into the core attributes of
146. Horovitz, supra note 23, at 131–32.
147. Id. at 151–52, 162.
The fact that a computer program cannot be seen or felt should not preclude UCC
coverage, as the UCC does not make those qualities the test for exclusion. The
type of intangibility meant to be excluded from Article 2 that of choses in action,
is different from the type of intangibility characteristic of software. That program
instructions are intangible does not rule out UCC applicability, as programs can
be identified, moved, transferred, and sold in the same manner as other pieces of
personal property classified as goods.
Id. For a contrary view, Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38
DUQ. L. REV. 459, 535–37 (2000) (explaining that computer software does not fulfill the
requirement of “movability”).
148. BRADGATE, supra note 12, at 41–42, 50. However, the European Union has made that
distinction clear in its directives. See Directive 2011/83/EU, supra note 26, pmbl. (19), 2011 O.J.
(L 304) 64, 66 (E.U.).
149. An interesting analogy is found in Québec’s civil code, which states that “[w]aves or
energy harnessed and put to use by man, whether their source is movable or immovable, are
deemed corporeal movables.” CCQ, supra note 8, art. 906.
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property and ownership.150
The prevailing opinion that there needs to be a physical object
embedding information products protected by copyright for the first sale
or exhaustion doctrine to apply is another illustration of the confusion
between tangible property and services. For example, E.U. regulations
reflect a dichotomy between the distribution of physical objects
embedding information products and the delivery of downloadable
information products online, as if it necessarily implied that online
information products could only involve services.151 By doing so, the
E.U. regulations bury the delivery component of the distinct copy of an
information product in the services, generally viewed as intangibles.152
The function of the division between tangible and intangible property
and the impact it has on the definition of goods and on the application of
exceptions to copyright infringement (e.g., the first sale doctrine) signal
that commercial copies of information products distributed online should
reside prima facie on the tangible property side of the divide.
2. Confusing Intellectual Property with Personal Property of an
Information Product
The inconsistent qualification of information products also occurs
through the confusion between two distinct property rights: the intangible
personal property of the intellectual property right holder in the
information product (e.g., copyright in the musical or literary work) and
the personal property of the recipient in the copy of the work. At times,
courts are confused by the presence of the intangible property rights of
copyright holders when ascertaining the nature of the object at issue (e.g.,
commercial copies of the information product per se).153 This trend is
notable in computer software related case law (e.g., whether they

150. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
151. Eric Tjong Tjin Tai, Exhaustion and Online Delivery of Digital Works, 25 EUR.
INTELLECTUAL PROP. REV. 207, 208 (2003) (referring to the authoritative commentary by J. Gaster
on the E.U. Database Directive, who was closely involved with the drafting of various E.U.
directives pertinent to copyright exhaustion). For examples of such directives, see Directive
2001/29/EU, supra note 96, art. 4(2).
152. Tai, supra note 151.
153. Jean Braucher, Contracting out of Article 2 Using a “License” Label: A Strategy that
Should not Work for Software Products, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 261, 268 (2007). Robinson v.
Graves offers an older illustration of that confusion. See Robinson v. Graves, [1935] K.B. 579,
583–84. There, the English Court of Appeal needed to decide whether the commissioning of a
painting was a contract for skill and labor or one for the sale of goods. Id. Three of the judges
invoked the exclusive copyright of the painter, which could only be assigned to the eventual
purchaser of the painting by an act in writing, to conclude that the contract was one of skill and
labor and not for the sale of goods, confusing the copyright with the property rights in the physical
embodiment of the painting. Id. at 585, 591, 593.
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constitute goods or whether copyright infringement took place),154 in a
recent case involving the property nature of databases,155 or when courts
conclude by extrapolation that a license to the embedded intellectual
property necessarily implicates that the copy of the information product
is licensed and not sold to the recipient.156 The confusion between
intellectual property rights of the supplier and the property rights of the
recipient or buyer is predominant in virtual worlds. As Greg Lastowka
noted:
[I]t is not unusual for many people, including lawyers, to assume
that because virtual worlds feature creative expression and forms
of intangible value, they are entirely controlled through the laws
of intellectual property.
That is not correct. While intellectual property law plays a key role
in virtual worlds, it is a significant mistake to think that it occupies
the entire field.157
For Lastowka, virtual property (e.g., copies of creative works made
accessible to virtual world users), may be akin to William
Blackstone’s “incorporeal hereditaments,” and are properties distinct
from the intellectual property of their supplier.158
As opined in two leading American cases, the presence of the
copyright in the information product is irrelevant to the qualification
154. See generally Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 2 (giving an illustrative review of
U.S. Copyright Case Law). In Southwark LBC v. IBM UK, Ltd., the Queen’s Bench Division
decided that the U.K. Sale of Goods Act did not apply to software licenses because there was “no
transfer of property.” [2011] EWHC (TCC) 549, [95]. In doing so, the court placed particular
emphasis on the intellectual property rights of the supplier, and on the terms which pertained to
the copy of the copyright work (i.e., no right of transfer, obligation to destroy the copy upon
termination) with less emphasis on the fact that the licence in the copy of the software was
perpetual (which could indicate that the copy had been transferred to the purchaser). See id. The
same confusion arose in Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Systems Corp., 845 F.
Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994), and in Applied Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Daniel P. ICART & Brownstone
Agency, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). The confusion between the exclusive rights of
copyright holders and the ownership rights in the copy of the work also arises in the application
of exceptions of copyright infringement including 17 U.S.C. § 117 “Limitations on exclusive
rights: Computer programs.”
155. See Your Response, Ltd. v. Datateam Bus. Media, Ltd., [2014] EWCA (Civ.) 281
(holding that the common law lien could not apply to a database, the latter being intangible
property). In Your Response, the court relied on the applicable Copyright and Rights in Databases
Regulations 1997 (SI 1997/3032) regs. 6, which define the intellectual property rights in database
as intangible property, without considering that the copy of a database could be a distinct form of
property, separate from the intellectual property rights therein. Id. at [17].
156. BRADGATE, supra note 12, at 37.
157. GREG LASTOWKA, VIRTUAL JUSTICE 168 (2010).
158. Id. at 168–69.
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of the information product as good, service or of a sui generis nature.
In Advent Systems, Ltd. v. Unisys Corp.159 and Triangle Underwriters,
Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,160 computer software was held to constitute
goods under the relevant statutes.161 In Triangle Underwriters, the
U.S. District Court of E.D. New York observed:
Although the ideas or concepts involved in the custom designed
software remained Honeywell’s Intellectual Property, Triangle
was purchasing the product of those concepts. That product
required efforts to produce, but it was a product nevertheless, and
though intangible, is more readily characterized as “goods” than
“services.”162
To be sure, the copy of a musical recording for which the copyright
has expired (i.e., in which the copyright in the musical work, sound
recording and performers’ performance no longer survives) after the
consumer purchased the copy, does not change the nature of what the
consumer is accessing (e.g., the copy of a musical work). Whether there
is intangible copyright attached to the copy of the musical work or not
should not be conclusive for the purpose of determining the nature of the
product.163
Confusion may arise in determining whether an information product
is a good or service, between the ideas, the artistic or intellectual effort or
quality that go into the completion of an information product, and the end
product itself.164 This is a variance from the confusion between the
159. Advent Sys. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991).
160. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978),
affirmed on this issue, Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 747 (CANY
1979).
161. The distinction between the intangible intellectual property rights of the copyright
holders which often remain their property and the nature of the product delivered to the purchaser
was made in Triangle Underwriters. This case involved the supply of turnkey system including
hardware, custom application software, training services and maintenance support services. Id.
162. Id.
163. By contrast, the intangible nature of the rights of the copyright holder could be relevant
to ascertain whether, in a transaction under which the copyright holder assigns her copyright to
another party, sale of goods laws apply or not. See ATIYAH & ADAMS, supra note 23, at 66: “items
of intellectual property such as copyrights, patents and trademarks are not personal chattels or
corporeal movables and so fall outside the definition, although of course goods may exist which
embody these intellectual property rights.” See also Rodau, supra note 23, at 882.
164. For example in the case of software, it is reflected in the algorithms, coding
instructions, and sequences leading to a software which performs distinct functions. This is
particularly the case for contracts involving the delivery of a prototype or customized software or
other product, in spite of the fact that the end product involves a physical, tangible, movable
medium. Courts seem to be paying particular attention to the presence or not of standard
commercialized product (a good) or an unfinished product (such as a prototype). For example,
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intellectual property rights of the producer and personal property of the
recipient of the information product discussed here.165 In Advent Systems,
the U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, distinguished the two discreet
components comprising copies of information products (i.e., the ideas
and the commercialized end result) and emphasized the need to focus on
the latter:
Computer programs are the product of an intellectual process, but
once implanted in a medium are widely distributed to computer
owners. An analogy can be drawn to a compact disc recording of
an orchestral rendition. The music is produced by the artistry of
musicians and in itself is not a “good,” but when transferred to a
laser-readable disc becomes a readily merchantable commodity.
Similarly, when a professor delivers a lecture, it is not a good, but,
when transcribed as a book, it becomes a good.166
In that case, the Court held that computer software was a good for the
purposes of the relevant statute.167 Courts make similar distinctions in
strict liability cases whereby only the “tangible” end result—as opposed
to the information, ideas, or embedded expression—may qualify as a
product falling under such a purview.168 Thus, the presence of

see TK Power, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D.C.A. 2006), where the court held
that the delivery of prototypes was a contract of services not goods. Textron was bargaining more
for TK’s “knowledge, skill, and ability.” See also Data Processing Servs., Inc., 492 N.E.2d at
318–19, (customized software held to be a service).
165. The focus on the intellectual labor here typically serves to distinguish between
contracts for the sale of goods and contracts for labor and material, as opposed to determining
who owns the rights to the copy of the information product, and whether a sale or license of the
copy took place.
166. Advent Sys., Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (C.A.3 Pa. 1991).
167. Id. See Keillian West, Ltd. v. Sportspage Enters., Ltd., 1982 1251 (AB QB) where the
court made the distinction between the labor and the end product to decide that a contract for the
printing of 20,000 sports programs was a contract for the sale of goods, not for the provision of
services: “There is no reason to suppose that the substance of the contract was the skill and labour
involved in the production of the programmes rather than the programmes themselves.”
168. For example in Winter v G.P. Putnams’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991), the U.S.
Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, made the distinction between the ideas, expression and
commercialized end result:
A book containing Shakespeare’s sonnets consists of two parts, the material and
print therein, and the ideas and expression thereof. The first may be a product,
but the second is not. The latter, were Shakespeare alive, would be governed by
copyright laws; the laws of libel, to the extent consistent with the First
Amendment; and the laws of misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation,
negligence, and mistake. These doctrines applicable to the second part are aimed
at the delicate issues that arise with respect to intangibles such as ideas and
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intangibles, such as ideas and information, in the creation or
commercialized end result does not disqualify the end result from being
defined as a good. It is almost inconceivable that ideas, concepts, trade
secrets, information in the development process, or the end product are
not part and parcel of goods.169
The classification of various forms of property is not foreign to the
concept of transformation (e.g., from immovable to movable property or
from real to personal property in the Anglo-American tradition)
depending on the context.170 While sounds and visual elements have an
intangible nature that may well constitute the essence of a musical
recording or a film, they form part of “goods” when embedded in a
commercialized product through their registration in binary codes or
otherwise.171
As physical boundaries disappear for information products distributed
online without a physical object, eliminating the reminder that there is
some personal property and a good involved, it is likely that the observed
trend of the intangible intellectual property of right holders defining the
whole transaction will continue.
B. Suppliers’ Role in Shaping Information Products
Suppliers’ commercial practices, particularly where non-negotiated
standard terms of use prevail, shape to a large extent courts
characterization, as well as how recipients perceive information
products.172 This is especially true with information products, where new
expression. Products liability law is geared to the tangible world.
In that case, the plaintiff claimed that product strict liability regime applied to the publishers of a
book on mushrooms on which they relied and as a result of which they became very sick after
having eaten certain mushrooms. See also Sanders v Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264
(D. Colo. 2002); James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 798 (WDKY 2000).
169. Crescent Amusement Co. v. Carson, 187 Tenn. 112, 213 S.W.2d 27 (1948) (noting
this):
There is scarcely to be found any article susceptible to sale or rent that is not the
result of an idea, genius, skill and labor applied to a physical substance. A loaf
of bread is the result of the skill and labour of the cook who mixed the physical
ingredients and applied heat at the temperature and consistency her judgment
dictated. A radio is the result of the thought of a genius, or several such persons,
combined with the skill and labour of trained technicians applied to a tangible
mass of substance. An automobile is the result of all these elements, and of
patents, etc.; and so on, ad infinitum.
170. For example, in the civil law tradition, see CCQ, supra note 8, arts. 900–03.
171. In the context of the nature of computer software, see Rodau, supra note 23, at 875.
172. Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 2, at 1225, 1231–35. Attribute the deference courts
have to how suppliers characterize the information product in the contract to a specific view of

2015]

THE UNDUE RELIANCE ON PHYSICAL OBJECTS

101

technologies and commercial offerings challenge previous conceptions
and bring the law to unchartered territories. The new grounds provide
more leeway to align and shape the information products with the
suppliers’ interests, a trend that can be observed in virtual worlds.173
Framing the contract as one of services may engender lower levels of
protection of recipients and different remedies than if the contract
involves goods.174 Licensing the copy of the information product rather
than selling it allows suppliers to retain more control on the product
generally, and circumvent the application of exceptions to copyright
infringement beneficial to recipients (including the first sale or
exhaustion doctrine).175
Courts generally rely on the terms of the contract to assess whether
the information is a good, a service or sui generis, whether there is a sale
or a license, and how the rights of intellectual property suppliers should
hold in these assessments. Unless there is a legal principle or doctrine that
makes the terms unenforceable, courts tend to defer to the terms of the
contract. The deference to the terms of the contract to determine the
nature of information products begs several questions. For one, to what
extent are property interests malleable by contract and to what extent is it
desirable to delegate the regulation of information products to private
ordering, particularly given the current prevalence of standardized nonnegotiated-contracts?176 Second, what legal species are suppliers
precisely creating? In order words, how does the law affect recipients and
suppliers of copies of information products purchased for a one-time fee?
Does the recipient maintain indefinite autonomous control even if she
may not transfer the copy to another party? To what extent does the
supplier retain property rights in the copies made available once the
product is delivered to the recipient? Do these uncategorized rights to
copies of information products, both from the perspective of suppliers
and of recipients, not deserve more legal scrutiny?
The confusion identified above, between the personal property of the
recipient in the information product, and the intellectual property of
suppliers embedded in the product,177 enables suppliers’ ability to shape
the nature of the information product and related transaction. The
intellectual property rights of suppliers overshadow the underlying
property as being “an infinitely malleable bundle of rights.” Recipients may be favorably biased
toward the accuracy and legality of standard terms and conditions based on their trust of the firm,
in particular of large, reputable firms. See also RADIN, supra note 82, at 12.
173. On how suppliers are seeking to eliminate emerging virtual property through contract,
see Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1082–84 (2005).
174. See supra Part II.A.
175. See discussion supra Parts II.B & II.C.
176. I look further into these questions in infra Part IV.B.
177. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
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property rights of recipients unfairly shifting the balance of power to
favor the holders of intellectual property. This imbalance overrides basic
rights, privileges and powers that are common attributes of recipients’
property, giving intellectual property right holders carte blanche in how
they shape the entire transaction through standard non-negotiated
contracts.
C. Assessment: What is at Stake?
Looking at the uneasiness to transmute the law of physical objects to
the online virtual world described so far, one could respond with
skepticism at attempts to mirror the offline world to the online world:
what are the underlying justifications to defer to old property rules to
define information products in the online world? Should concepts such
as delivery, possession, powers of transmission and transfer give way to
new rules given their transformation in the online world? The short
answer to critiques against mimicking traditional property concepts to the
online world is that property, as a hard-wired concept, remains at the
center of the commercialization of information products online, including
virtual worlds. Suppliers invoke their intellectual property interests and
rights in various ways: to restrict recipients’ power to transfer copies of
information products, so as to avoid the application of the first sale
doctrine; to claim rights to recipients’ enhancements to the information
products they supplied, or to bury possible ownership rights of
information product recipients in the platform which suppliers own or
through the related services that they provide to recipients. Suppliers’
stronghold on information products requires an evenhanded legal and
normative approach that calls for a greater articulation of recipients’
property rights. The questions become: what reallocations of property
interests take place as a result of the requirements of a physical object,
juxtaposed with the intangible intellectual property rights of right
holders? What are the legal and normative effects of these reallocations
and do they give rise to double standards? Should they be rectified?
1. Replacement of Recipients’ Property Freedoms with Suppliers’
Control Powers
The trends identified so far lead to a decrease of recipients’ rights to
information products. The trend adds on to the well-documented
constraining effects of technological protection measures and their legal
endorsement worldwide on recipients’ rights to information products.178
There too, the emphasis on the presence of a physical object is noticeable,
178. See Chapdelaine, supra note 80, at 21–26.
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as courts have been more reluctant to enforce technological protection
measures when embedded in a physical object (e.g., a garage door lock)
than in absence of it.179 Some may argue that this is the inevitable result
of the digital revolution, that in order to survive, suppliers of information
products must respond with legal and technological ammunition to the
facility with which users can copy, share and distribute information
products. Recipients have much to gain too by technological
enhancements: increasing multiplicity of uses, flexibility and
convenience (e.g., through the cloud: storage space, shifting access
devices, on-demand access, and increased offerings). Under that view,
the shrinking of recipients’ legal rights may be largely compensated by
their gains as technologically empowered consumers. For this line of
argument to have value, one needs to assume that the decline in
recipients’ ownership rights is necessary for information products to
subsist and for their recipients to benefit from incessant technological
empowerment. Otherwise, the allegedly inevitable trade-off of recipients’
property rights for enhanced consumer experience should be more
adequately described as a window of opportunity for suppliers to increase
their power over recipients, by sowing dependency and creating new
revenue streams. The case has yet to be made that the reallocation of
property rights away from recipients of information products is essential
and inevitable.180
To assess what it is that recipients are losing and if it is of significant
value, one may turn to the theoretical foundations of property as a means
to organize everyday life, commerce and relationships, and as a tool of
power allocation. James Harris’s influential conception of property in
Property and Justice181 usefully provides a detailed account of the
“ownership spectrum” which proves particularly helpful to assert the
nature of rights to information products.182
Harris views property as a necessary vehicle of freedom and
autonomous choice, through the ubiquitous manifestation in society of a
wide spectrum of ownership interests.183 Ownership is an “organizing
idea” under which all of these interests share (to varying degrees) open179. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA, 22 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1119 (2007).
180. The shrinking or recipients property rights at the expense of suppliers raises similar
questions to the ones involved in the debate on the merits of technological protection measures as
endorsed by international copyright conventions and national legislation worldwide. See
Chapdelaine, supra note 80, at 21–26; Carys Craig, Locking Out Lawful Users: Fair Dealing and
Anti-Circumvention in Bill C-32, in FROM RADICAL EXTREMISM TO BALANCED COPYRIGHT:
CANADIAN COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL AGENDA 177 (Michael Geist ed., 2010).
181. HARRIS, supra note 3. See PROPERTIES OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JIM HARRIS
(Timothy Endicott et al. eds., 2006).
182. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
183. HARRIS, supra note 3.
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ended privileges, powers and self-seekingness with respect to a
resource.184 To invoke freedom as a moral justification for maintaining a
property institution, one must ask, “whether inherent property freedoms
are a necessary feature of the just society.”185 The proposition is that quite
apart from instrumental reasons, “property institutions, by their very
nature, confer freedoms (ranges for autonomous choice) which would not
exist without them; and for this reason no citizen is treated justly by his
community unless it institutes or maintains a property institution.”186
Hence, open-ended uses and privileges nurture freedoms that contribute
to autonomous choice and prima facie justify property institutions.187
Harris arrives at this conclusion by finding no convincing argument that
any of the powers and privileges on the ownership spectrum should be a
priori excluded from the concept of ownership: “[t]he spectrum has
evolved in human history and is available within property institutions as
a means of conferring ranges of autonomous choice on individuals or
groups.”188
A contrario, if there were no property-specific justice reasons to
support those freedoms, “countless day-to-day unquestioned assumptions
about people being free to do what they like with their own things and
their own money would turn out to be morally suspect.”189 Autonomy is
a value frequently invoked to justify property and more particularly
personal property.190
When suppliers constrain the capacity of recipients to own
184. Id. at 63ff. See discussion infra Part IV.A (applying the three components of the
ownership spectrum to information products).
185. HARRIS, supra note 3, at 231.
186. Id. at 230; see JAMES O. GRUNEBAUM, PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 182–83 (1987) (basing the
moral justification of ownership in autonomy, developing a theory of “autonomous ownership,”
and within that framework, acknowledging how use controls of consumer goods violate
autonomy: “Community control over consumer goods, either in the form of what goods are
produced or control in the form of what uses consumer products may be put to, would violate
autonomy.”).
187. HARRIS, supra note 3, at 231.
188. Id. at 275.
189. Id. at 65; see also GRUNEBAUM, supra note 186, at 183.
190. See, e.g., GRUNEBAUM, supra note 186, at 183:
The idea that autonomy requires a wide range of rights of title over consumer
goods implies that so called consumer sovereignty is a moral as well as the
economic requirement to maintain the value of income and to achieve or measure
efficiency. That consumers legitimately exercise a wide range of rights of title
over goods for personal consumption applies not only to what they actually
purchase but to what is available for their purchase. Not only should individuals
be able to exercise a broad range of rights of title over their living quarters, for
example, but they should also have a wide range of options about the kinds of
living quarters made available.
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information products through contract, and when courts endorse such
schemes, the nurtured freedoms allowing open-ended countless acts
unrestricted by state control are impaired. To some extent, the level of
autonomy and freedom away from the state, made possible through the
vehicle that is property, is taken away for the benefit and control of the
firm. The prima facie open-ended powers and privileges that go without
saying when owning a resource become potentially suspicious
reviewable acts subject to the firm’s surveillance. This is the shift
occurring when contract, instead of property concepts, dictates the rights
to information product that in all respects have the attributes of a
resource. The shift to contracts to control innumerable resources utilized
by recipients undermines the traditional justification for the creation of
property rights to ensure the most effective allocation and use of
resources.191
Consequently, the shift takes away recipients’ benefit to sale of goods
warranties that would otherwise apply (implied warranties of quality,
fitness for use, title and quiet possession) and the application of the first
sale doctrine and other exceptions to copyright infringement to the benefit
of recipients of information products. Given the overall policy objective
of consumer protection laws and the additional level of protection that
they offer to consumers,192 any issue of scope that may discredit the
application of statutory implied obligations to consumer transactions
needs to be examined carefully. When this exclusion affects an
increasingly large segment of the consumer market (i.e., information
products distributed online), there is cause for concern. When it is
compounded with the increasing trivialization of the ownership rights in
copies of information products, an alarming pattern of diminished rights
and protection for consumers starts to take shape.
Beyond taking away open-ended powers and privileges of information
product recipients, some suppliers’ efforts to become owners of all
enhancements made gratuitously by recipients on their copies of
information products have been analogized, endorsed even, as a new form
of feudalism.193 Are these resource allocations desirable? What ground
rules, if any, may limit the malleability of how suppliers can define
resources, constrain recipients’ property interests, or inflate their own
property interests through contract?

191. See Fairfield, supra note 173, at 1064–76 (application of various property theories to
virtual property).
192. See discussion supra Part II.A.
193. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Virtual World Feudalism, 118 YALE L.J. Pocket Part
126 (2009) (analogizing the relationship between operators and users of virtual worlds as one of
feudalism and arguing that such relationship is defensible).
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2. Double Standards
The requirement of a physical object juxtaposed with the intangible
intellectual property of right holders in the information products leads to
double standards in how courts and legislators account for the property
rights of suppliers (intellectual property holders) in comparison to the
rights of recipients. The general trend of courts and legislators to favor
the rights of intellectual property holders by minimizing property rights
in the copies of information products exemplifies the double standard.194
The requirement of a physical object for the copy of an information
product to qualify as a good under sale of goods law, while the same
requirement of a physical object is not required for a copy to be infringing
under copyright law, further illustrates the double standard being applied
between right holders and recipients of information products.195
Moreover, the non-application of the first sale doctrine to information
products distributed online is yet another manifestation wherein the rights
and interests of intellectual property holders are bolstered at the expense
of the power of transfer normally vested to recipients of information
products.196
A possible response to the double standard critique is that it may be
justifiable on policy grounds to assign different weights to competing
property interests given the interests’ inherent nature and respective
functions. No property interests are absolute; all can be subject to
legitimate limitations including property-limitation rules.197 For example,
copyright restrains the right of users to make reproductions of the work,
unless the copies are permitted pursuant to an exception to copyright
infringement (e.g., fair dealing, fair use, reproduction for private
purposes, non-commercial user generated content). The intellectual
property of copyright holders would take precedence over the personal
property of users by restraining their ability to make copies without
compensation in a way that competes with the economic rights of
copyright holders. In the case of the requirement of a physical object for
the copy of an information product to qualify as a good or for first sale to
apply, the discussion about the competing property interests is at times
completely absent, or at best, fails to duly take into account the purpose
194. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
195. See Jean Braucher, Contracting Out of Article 2 Using A “License” Label: A Strategy
that Should Not Work for Software Products, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 261, 268 (2006); see also Juliet
M. Moringiello, What Virtual Worlds Can Do for Property Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 159, 167–68
(2010).
196. See supra Part II.C.
197. See HARRIS, supra note 3, at 34 (defining property-limitation rules as where prima facie
normative claims, founded on the prevailing ownership conception, are overridden, and said rules
are premised on the notion that, but for the limitation they contain, the owner would be free to do
as he pleases).
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and function of personal property interests in copies of information
products.198 The question for courts and legislators is whether the
disparate treatment that different types of copies of information products
receive does not amount to an illegitimate double standard. Unfortunately
at this point, it does not appear that this question has been addressed
properly.
3. Legal and Normative Incoherence
The resulting legal and normative incoherence caused by both the
degradation of the property freedoms afforded to recipients of
information products for the benefit of suppliers’ contractual powers and
the double standards to how concepts of goods or property are applied
should concern courts and policymakers.
As information products share the same attributes of property in all
respects, failing to enforce the personal property rights of recipients of
such products either by deferring to the terms of supplier contracts or by
disqualifying such products due to physical form may lead to dissonance
and arbitrary results.199 Ultimately, it risks undermining the efficiency
and moral grounds imbued within property institutions that have helped
to shape and organize human societies for millennia.200 In order to avoid
this legal and normative degradation, what are the attributes of personal
property that should enlighten conceptions of and the co-existence
between tangible and intangible property? How can property interests be
altered by contract and if so, under what justifications and ground rules?

198. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 2, at 1245–60 (arguing that copy owners need
to be distinguished from the public as a matter of copyright policy on the basis of inter alia,
consumer incentives to discourage copyright infringement).
199. See GREEN & RANDALL, supra note 4, at 124 (raising similar concerns of consistency
on the reluctance to apply the tort of conversion to digital assets).
200. Id. at 124–25 (regarding the reluctance by courts to apply the tort of conversion to
digital assets):
Digitized assets are commodities in the same way as those assets which are
conventionally protected by the law of property. Failing to safeguard property
interests in them will have the same effects as failing to recognise property in
traditional assets, since the legal relationship between person and asset is much
the same where both types of assets are concerned. As we have seen, it is the
behaviour of the parties in relation to the assets in question which is, or should
be, determinative of whether a conversion has occurred.
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IV. RELOCATING THE PERSONAL PROPERTY IN
INFORMATION PRODUCTS
What are the required elements of an information product that justify
dispensing with the physical object and treating it as a functional
equivalent for the benefit of its recipient? When should property rights in
the information product (the good) be recognized and allocated to the
recipient and when should the information product be treated as a service
with the related property interests being mostly retained by the supplier?
The answer lies in great part in the relationship the recipient has with the
information product and in particular, her ability to own the information
product. It also depends largely on the malleability of property interests
through contracts.
A. Recipients’ Ownership of Information Products
As information products that have no supporting physical media tend
to be fluid, the dividing lines between the product, the method of delivery,
the underlying code structure and operational services are not clear. The
concept of ownership as an organizing idea201 and legal construct focuses
on the relationship between the person and the resource,202 which is
central to the proper characterization and regulation of information
products. While possession is useful to identify the presence of personal
property and of a good, ownership, when asserted in favor of recipients
is a tipping point in how information products are regulated.
The legal analysis of ownership aims to distill the essential
characteristics that should be present for an information product to
qualify as the personal property of its recipient and as good. This exercise
will bring a more refined understanding of tangible personal property
beyond an object capable of being touched, and broaden the meaning of
tangible by encompassing its secondary meanings.203
In Property and Justice, James Harris defines the essence of every
property institution as the twin manifestation of trespassory rules204 and
201. See HARRIS, supra note 3, at 63ff.
202. See id. at 67 (“Ownership powers of control and transmission all involve capacity to
create relations with others by virtue of a person’s ownership of something. Powers to control
uses by others are as open-ended a class as are ownership use-privileges.”).
203. See Definition of Tangible, CANADIAN OXFORD DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2004) (stating the
secondary meanings of “tangible” are “clearly intelligible; that can be grasped by the mind, not
elusive or visionary” or “substantial” definite; that may be clearly viewed, evaluated, or
calculated” or a “a tangible thing, esp. an asset.”).
204. See HARRIS, supra note 3, at 24, 86 (referring to “trespassory rules” as all rules which,
by reference to a resource, impose obligations (negative or positive) upon an open ended range of
persons, with the exception of some privileged individual, group, or agency (i.e., the owner(s));
they are open-ended and give rise to various civil or criminal remedies such as damages,
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the existence of an ownership spectrum.205 Harris’s influential conception
of property offers one among numerous accounts of the main attributes
of property and of the nature of ownership.206 The “twin-manifestation”
framework that Harris proposes to define property emphasizes the
“bundle of rights” notion that is often ascribed to property, as well as the
power to exclude, opposable to all.207
According to Harris, we need to understand the underlying “propertyspecific justice reasons” that withstand each form of property to
determine its proper scope.208 Harris’s tailored approach to the nature of
the resource (e.g., an information product) and the underlying reasons for
its legal protection are highly pertinent to define the personal tangible
property of information products.
The various forms of ownership on Harris’s “ownership spectrum”
have in common: (i) a juridical relation between a person and a
resource,209 (ii) privileges and powers that are open ended and (iii) that
authorize self-seekingness by the owner.210 These three requirements will
serve to identify when tangible personal property may subsist in
information products accessed by recipients.
1. Juridical Relation Between a Person and a Resource
The requirement of a juridical relation between a person and a
resource on the ownership spectrum implies that the person and the
resource can be separately identified.211 Identifying a resource requires
that it can be circumscribed. In the context of information products,
possessory recovery, injunction, or restitution, and they presuppose the existence of a separate,
reasonably identifiable resource).
205. Id. at 5 (stating the ownership spectrum spans from “mere property” to “full-blooded
ownership.”).
206. See TONY HONORÉ, MAKING LAW BIND ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 165–79
(1987) (providing on the concept of ownership a detailed account of the incidents of ownership
which include: the right to possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to the income
and capital of the thing, the right to security and the duty to prevent harm); see also GRUNEBAUM,
supra note 186, at 3, 182.
207. See HARRIS, supra note 3, at 5 (describing property institutions as encompassing the
twin manifestation of trespassory rules and the presence of an ownership spectrum which
comprises powers and privileges between a person and a resource that are prima facie openended). For a brief overview of various conceptions of property, see Pascale Chapdelaine, The
Property Attributes of Copyright, 10 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 34, 52–53 (2014).
208. HARRIS, supra note 3, at 168.
209. Id. at 332 (implying the ability to identify each and a separateness between the two);
JAMES E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 105–28 (1997).
210. HARRIS, supra note 3, at 65 (Self-seekingness refers to this intimate relationship
between the owner and the resource as to how she chooses to dispose of the resource, with prima
facie no duty to account to any one for the merit or rationality of that preference).
211. Id. at 332 (This is a requirement for any property institution); PENNER, supra note 209,
at 105–28.
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fixation in some perceptible form for independent and autonomous
consumption would fulfill that requirement.212 For instance, consumers’
abilities to access digital products on a permanent basis and to store them,
should be determining factors for assessing whether digital content could
qualify as a good.213 Directive 2011/83/EU opted for a different approach,
treating digital content with no physical supporting medium exchanged
hand-to-hand as neither goods nor services, but as sui generis.214 As
opposed to the ability to access digital products on a permanent basis, the
sequential release of information that is not fixed for the ongoing
independent and autonomous consumption of the recipient (e.g., a
performance in public of a play or a broadcast) would not have the
attributes of a resource for the recipient’s purposes.215
Identifying a distinct resource implies some form of scarcity.
Intellectual property laws create artificial scarcity (e.g., through
copyright) to prohibit unauthorized reproduction and other acts that could
otherwise be performed freely with respect to a work of authorship.216
Because intellectual property rights are often present in information
products, the artificial scarcity enables the creation of rival, individually
identifiable lawful copies of information products. The copy of an
information product downloaded lawfully from the Internet becomes the
copy of the recipient, which sets it apart from all others.217 The copy of
the information products becomes even more unique when the recipient
adapts or modifies it for her own personal uses.218 This ability to
212. See Horovitz, supra note 23, at 132–33; 151–52.
213. Position paper on the regulation of digital products prepared by BEUC. Digital
Products, How to Include them in the Proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive, at 5 (June 9,
2010), available at http://www.beuc.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=2135 [hereinafter Digital
Products]; About BEUC, BEUC, http://www.beuc.org/about-beuc/who-we-are (last visited Apr.
6, 2015) (stating that BEUC is the European Consumers’ Organization that acts as the umbrella
organization for 40 independent national consumer organizations across Europe. Its main task is
to represent the interests of these organizations and all consumers across Europe).
214. See Directive 2011/83/EU, supra note 26, recital p. 25.
215. Copyright law imposes a requirement of fixation for works of authorship to be
protected. See, e.g., Galerie d’art du Petit Champlain, Inc. v. Théberge, 2002 SCC 34, [2002] 2
S.C.R. 336, ¶ 145 (Can.) (stating “[t]he work is, so to speak, the physical outcome of the creative
process. Fixation of the work in a medium is a condition sine qua non of the production of a
work.” The requirement of fixation in copyright law and the qualification of goods in sale of goods
law (and consumer law) share a common preoccupation of an identifiable and perceptible product
that persists in time beyond its moment of creation or interpretation).
216. HARRIS, supra note 3, at 42–43; Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and
Free Riding, TEXAS L. REV. 1031, 1055 (2005).
217. On the discussion of rivalry and virtual property, see Fairfield, supra note 173, at 1053–
55, who suggests that the perfect digital copies of copyright works do not embody the same rivalry
aspects as virtual property developed in virtual worlds.
218. See, e.g., Geoffrey Fowler, Amazon Pays for Eating Student’s Homework, WALL ST.
J.L. BLOG (Oct. 1, 2009, 2:14 p.m.), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/10/01/amazon-pays-foreating-students-homework/?mod=rss_WSJBlog (discussing claims recipients of information
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personalize immaterial copies of information products largely
compensates for the lack of distinct physical object boundaries for the
purpose of assessing the actual level of rivalry posed by numerous digital
copies of the same copyright work.
2. Open-ended Privileges and Powers
The second feature common to all ownership interests on the
ownership spectrum is that the privileges and powers that a person has in
a resource are prima facie open-ended.219 The open-ended texture of
powers and privileges distinguishes ownership interests from other nonownership proprietary interests that confer specific privileges and
powers.220 The infinite ways by which a person can prima facie interact
with a resource distinguish ownership interests in a resource from a
product the use of which would be entirely governed by the terms of a
contract as is sometimes the case in virtual worlds.221 The significance of
prima facie open-ended powers and privileges to define ownership of a
resource as opposed to other legal relationships, is often overlooked when
defining property as an infinitely malleable bundle of rights.
Copyright increasingly limits some of the prima facie open-ended
privileges and powers to copies of information products.222 Although
copyright shapes to a large extent the privileges and powers of recipients
of information products and is highly relevant in the broader discussion
of the scope of copyright user rights, copyright does not preclude
ownership in copies of information products. The underlying intellectual
property of right holders needs to be separated from the present
assessment of sorting out which information products should qualify as
recipients’ personal tangible property and as goods, as opposed to the
property of suppliers, or as services.
The ability to exercise open-ended privileges and powers implies
some physical control of the resource. For instance, recipients of
information products may exercise physical control over copies they
products may have on enhancements they make on their digital copies, specifically referencing a
successful settlement between Amazon and a student who sued when Amazon deleted his e-book,
thus deleting his homework assignment); see also Caitlin J. Akins, Conversion of Digital
Property: Protecting Consumers in the Age of Technology, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 215, 244–
46 (2010).
219. HARRIS, supra note 3, at 5.
220. Id. at 55–58 (stating that easements, for example, would fall under the category of nonownership proprietary interests).
221. The rights of members to virtual world sites have been largely defined by contract. See
generally Fairfield, supra note 173; see also GREG LASTOWKA, VIRTUAL JUSTICE 193 (2010).
222. A specific view of property as being “an infinitely malleable bundle of rights” has
effects in the online world and intersection between contract and property. See Perzanowski &
Schultz, supra note 2, at 1225, 1233–34.

112

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 20

download (e.g., ability to identify a copy as one’s own, store it, and
autonomously use it without resorting to a service provider). A musical
recording or copy of film lawfully downloaded from the Internet (should)
give(s) recipients the open-ended privileges and powers to enjoy the work
autonomously through physical control, with powers of transfer. By
contrast, the streaming or broadcast of a film does not give the same
autonomous capacity to consumers, although with on-demand streaming
and other services, the level of autonomy that consumers enjoy with
respect to the service comes closer to the autonomy of an owner.
Recipients of streaming services do not exercise prima facie open-ended
physical control over the copy they stream, to the extent that a large
portion of the physical power remains in the hands of the service provider
(i.e., the copy is stored on a server over which the recipient has no
physical control, and each individual access to the information product is
incumbent upon the service provider making streaming available).
Recipients may have a transferable interest in a subscription to the ondemand streaming services, which may share the attributes of a property
interest. However, the power of control and transfer pertains to the
subscription to the service, not to the information product per se.
Movability has been invoked as one of the open-ended privileges that
should be a determining factor to qualify information products as tangible
personal property as opposed to a service or intangible property, in
particular in the context of the U.S. UCC.223 One commentator noted with
respect to the categorization of computer software, “A program is
intangible in the sense that it cannot be touched or felt, but not in the sense
that it cannot be moved and identified to a contract.”224 Computer
programs and other copies of information products are movable tradable
objects regardless of their material form.225 Movability is the underlying
requirement for the transfer of ownership as another means to distinguish
specific goods from other products.226
The power to transfer title to a resource is among the most important
of all open-ended powers and privileges of ownership.227 The power to
transfer title to a resource is central to sale of goods and related consumer
223. Horovitz, supra note 23, at 162 (noting with respect to the categorization of computer
software under the U.S. UCC: “A program is intangible in the sense that it cannot be touched or
felt, but not in the sense that it cannot be moved and identified to a contract.”).
224. Id. But see Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38
DUQ. L. REV. 459, 535–36 (2000) (giving a contrary view that computer software does not fulfill
the requirement of “movability.”).
225. See Jean Braucher, Contracting Out of Article 2 Using A “License” Label: A Strategy
that Should Not Work for Software Products, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 261, 268 (2006) (stating that
“[s]oftware copies can be moved in various ways, including on computers and disks and by
electronic download.”).
226. See Smith & Woods, supra note 43, at 45.
227. See HONORÉ, supra note 206, at 165–79 (giving the components of ownership).
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protection laws, the concept of sale traditionally embedding transfer of
title.228 The ability to transfer a resource to someone else is a determining
factor in distinguishing goods from services. As noted with respect to the
classification of goods and services under World Trade Organization and
E.U. law:
On one level, the notion of property transfer appears inherently
bound up with goods and not services because the acquisition of
ownership from the producer is predicated on the transfer of
possession of the product. Such possession entails “actual holding
or having something as one’s own,” implying either physical
existence of the thing possessed or the right to exercise control
over the product.229
Often, recipients’ inability to transfer the copy to the information
product is imposed by the supplier, either through a contractual restriction
or through technological protection measures. In determining which
information products can be owned by recipients, barriers imposed by the
supplier need to be distinguished from other physical or conceptual
barriers to ownership (e.g., the information product is not under the
physical control of the recipient and therefore recipient has no power to
transfer it). The distinction between barriers imposed by suppliers and
other physical barriers lies in suppliers’ power to shape the nature of
information products. When an information product fulfills for all other
intents and purposes the requirements of ownership by their recipient, the
restriction on transfer imposed by suppliers needs to pass the same level
of scrutiny as any other restrictions on the alienation of property.
3. Privileges and Powers that Authorize Self-Seekingness to the Owner
The third feature common to all ownership interests on the ownership
spectrum is that the privileges and powers that a person has in the
resource authorize self-seekingness for the owner.230 Self-seekingness is
the intimate relationship between the owner and the resource as to how
the owner chooses to dispose of the resource, with prima facie no duty to
account to any one on the merit or rationality of that preference.231
The self-seekingness requirement for ownership to subsist in a
resource is particularly helpful to highlight the impact that copyright
228. See GERALD H.L. FRIDMAN, SALE OF GOODS IN CANADA 61 (5th ed. 2005) (discussing
the various potential meanings of “property” and “transfer of property” when employed in a sale
of goods law framework); see also ATIYAH & ADAMS, supra note 23, at 68–71.
229. Smith & Woods, supra note 43, at 45.
230. HARRIS, supra note 3, at 5.
231. See id. at 65.
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holders’ rights have on recipients’ enjoyment of information products.
Given the inherent power of copyright holders to restrict the performance
of defined acts on their works without their authorization, recipients have
a lot to account for to copyright holders. As a result, recipients’ ownership
of copies of information products subject to copyright sits significantly
lower on the ownership spectrum than other goods.
The self-seekingness requirement of ownership is helpful to
distinguish the copies of information products that may be owned by their
recipients from those that may not. The self-seekingness aspect common
to all ownership interests is also helpful to discern another important
feature that recipients are forfeiting when they do not own the copies of
information products that they access. An information product accessed
through on-demand streaming services would allow some level of selfseekingness to the recipient (i.e., no duty to account to anyone (e.g., the
time of day, frequency, purpose of use, in what circles)) while still being
constrained to a large extent by the streaming service provider (the
specific information product may only be available for a limited period
of time, the service may be down from time to time, or the recipient may
not have access to an internet connection at any given time, the recipient
may abandon the service provider if the fees increase, or the service
supplier may be out of business; in all scenarios, the recipient would stop
having access to the information product). In contrast, when the recipient
downloads the copy of an information product to her computer or on his
Internet storage space, the recipient would be allowed to a greater level
of self-seekingness in that she could enjoy the information product
independently, autonomously, and for an indefinite duration.
Here too, the obstacles to ownership imposed by the supplier contract
terms need to be distinguished from other conceptual or physical barriers
to owning copies of information products (as it would be the case where
the copy is accessed through an on-demand streaming service).232 Copies
of information products provided under supplier contract denying any
ownership rights to the recipient, but which for all intents and purposes
give the same level of self-seekingness as if they were legally owned by
the recipient, are among the factors that a court should consider to
determine whether a sale of the information product took place regardless
of contract terms to the contrary.233

232. See supra Part IV.A.2.
233. Freedom of contract will generally guide courts to defer to the contract terms (assuming
they are enforceable). In some cases, and when policy reasons justify court’s intervention, courts
have taken a substantive and functional approach to interpret computer license agreements as
effectively amounting to a sale. See, e.g., Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp.,
2012 E.C.R. at 10; see supra text accompanying notes 71-87.
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B. Property Versus Contracts
Once the relevant criteria to assert tangible property interests in
information products have been identified, supplier contract terms that
suggest that the information product does not confer property rights to
the recipient, or that suppress property powers and privileges, should
come under a different scrutiny. Failure to recognize recipients’ property
interests may lead to double standards in addition to legal and normative
incoherence in a way that risks undermining the foundations and function
of the property institution, including important efficiency considerations.
The lack of recognition of recipients’ personal property interests in
information products may also bring to the fore the legitimacy of the
scope of copyright and other forms of intellectual property. As property
interests in information products are a vehicle promoting distinct values
that need to be recognized and preserved, courts and legislators should be
particularly attentive when the contracts are non-negotiated standard
terms (which is prevalent in the commercialization of information
products). It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed
account of the extent to which contracts may shape property interests.
Suffice here to make a few remarks on the various legal tools that should
be considered to mediate between the property interests in copies of
information products and contradictory or unfavorable supplier contract
terms.
The conception of property and ownership adopted here to better
define the nature of information products sets inherent limits to the
malleability of the bundle of rights that ownership proprietary interests
entail.234 Beyond the size of the circle of persons against whom the
property or contract right can be asserted (i.e., trespassory powers in rem
versus rights in personam) it is the prima facie open-ended powers and
privileges that the recipient has with respect to the product authorizing
self-seekingness (as opposed to a closed list of dos and don’ts) that set
property interests apart from contract rights.
One may argue that we should confer suppliers as much flexibility as
possible to develop their commercial offerings, (with market forces
ensuring recipients’ adequate and most efficient access to information
products), and that this flexibility should include trumping property rights
by contract rights. While free market economies generally support
234. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 2, at 1225, 1233–35 (arguing that the “bundle
of rights” theories about property have facilitated a greater blurriness between property and
contracts, in the broader context of vanishing personal property rights in copies of copyright
works). See id. at 1233–34 (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property /Contract
Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001)) (stating “[i]f property rights are nothing more than in
personam right writ large, we should expect property law to embrace the same flexibility and
granularity we see in the realm of privately negotiated agreements.”).
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flexibility and creativity in how suppliers commercialize their products,
allegedly allowing market dynamics to play out for the benefit of all, this
line of argument fails to account for a few important points. First, it
presupposes that property interests are infinitely malleable at the whim
of suppliers’ preferences, which is problematic both legally and
normatively. If the information product as supplied has the substantive
characteristics of being owned by the recipient, terms of contract that
state the contrary should not be taken at face value. In other words,
favoring suppliers’ flexibility in how they craft their business offering
should not occur at the expense of legal and normative coherence, and
recipients’ reasonable expectations. How the creation of double standards
in property, copyright and intellectual property law particularly
undermines the public policy considerations that withstand the scope of
copyright, is a factor that should not be ignored. Second, suppliers retain
much flexibility in how they may deploy their commercial offerings (e.g.,
supply of goods, services, lease, rental, hire, sale, limited term, for
specific uses and territory) without having to unilaterally declare that
recipients have no property rights if de facto, property interests they have.
Third, the alleged market efficiency that supposedly benefits all parties
needs to be weighed against the decrease of efficiency occasioned by
idiosyncratic rights and interests created by contract terms as opposed to
more homogeneous property rights and interests.
Once the relevant criteria to assert tangible property interests in
information products have been identified, and once the potential perils
of failing to recognize such property interests are acknowledged, what
tools are available to legislators and the judiciary to constrain contract
terms seeking to trump the property interests of information product
recipients? It is beyond the scope of this article to give a detailed account
of what legal tools and doctrines may allow courts and legislators to
constrain the effect of contract terms on the property interests in
information products. Suffice here for our purposes to highlight some of
the mostly relevant tools.
First, the numerus clausus principle, by which there is a fixed and
closed list of property rights recognized by law and, as a corollary,
limitations on how property rights may be altered by contract,235 is one
tool that may equip the judiciary (and eventually legislators through
legislative reform) in constraining contract terms that seek to alter the
rights of recipients of information products to an unrecognizable form of
property. This concept is generally understood to be part of the civil law
tradition, although it is not immune from inconsistencies in its
application.236 The civil law typically enumerates the entitlements of
235. HARRIS, supra note 3, at 58.
236. See David Lametti, Concept of Property: Relation Through Objects of Social Wealth,
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ownership237 and its possible dismemberments.238 The restriction on “the
exercise of the right to dispose of property” is explicitly prohibited except
in limited circumstances,239 and is subject to specific conditions.240 There
is a growing recognition that a similar principle exists in property
common law,241 although this is not without controversy.242 Thomas
Merrill and Henry Smith conducted a survey on the common law of
property to demonstrate that the same principle exists in this legal
tradition, although not uniformly and without bearing any specific
appellation.243 For Merrill and Smith, numerus clausus is best described
as a “norm of judicial self-governance” rather than as a statutory or
constitutional tool of interpretation.244 It is “an extremely important
qualification of the freedom of contract.”245 The survey that Merrill and
Smith conducted on the common law of property led them to conclude
that there were even fewer forms of property available for personal
property than for real property.246 In other words, there is a greater level
of standardization in the realm of personal property than with respect to
real property. As Merrill and Smith argue, the justifying benefit of
numerous clausus is to constrain information processing costs of all
personal property owners of similar copies of information products and,
53 U. TORONTO L.J. 325, 360-61 (2003) (discussing how numerous clausus applies in the Québec
civil law system).
237. CCQ, supra note 8, art. 947 (defining the rights of ownership as “the right to use, enjoy
and dispose of property fully and freely . . . .”).
238. Id. art. 1119 (listing dismemberments of ownership as “[u]sufruct, use, servitude and
emphyteusis” and confirming that they are real rights).
239. Id. art. 1212 (stating a prohibition on the exercise of the right to dispose of property
may only be done by gift or will).
240. Id. (stating the “stipulation of inalienability” needs to be in writing and it is only valid
“if it is temporary and justified by a serious and legitimate interest.”); id. art. 1214 (providing that
“the stipulation of inalienability may not be set up against third persons uses unless it is published
in the proper register.”).
241. See, e.g., Thomas Merrill & Henry Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: the Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 9 (2000); Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: the Numerus Clausus Problem and the
Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002). See also HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY
VALUES & INSTITUTIONS 4 (2011) (discussing why the author supports the numerus clausus
principle within the institutions of property).
242. See e.g., Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449,
1482–84 (2004) (debating the existence of the numerus clausus principle in common law
property).
243. Merrill & Smith, supra note 241, at 9–23.
244. Id. at 11 (“Jurisprudentially speaking, the numerus clausus functions in the common
law much like a canon of interpretation, albeit a canon that applies to common-law decision
making rather than statutory or constitutional interpretation, or like a strong default rule in the
interpretation of property rights.”).
245. Id. at 5.
246. Id. at 17–18.
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at a broader level, of all personal property owners in a given
jurisdiction.247
The application of the numerus clausus principle may be even more
needed with respect to products without a physical object, where the
boundaries between property and contract are more porous and where the
rights of the recipient to the product may be harder to define.248 In the
context of copyright, it is one way to qualify copyright holders’ freedom
of contract to balance copyright holders’ interests against the competing
interests of copy owners. It constrains copyright holders’ possible
inclination to expand their property rights at the expense of personal
property copy owners.249 It mediates between competing property rights
and the effect that contracts can have on those rights.250
Moreover, the doctrine that condemns restrictions against alienation
of property (which may also be viewed as one manifestation of the
numerus clausus principle) would provide a rationale to constrain
contract terms that restrict the right to transfer the information product to
another party save the original buyer, a prevailing practice in the
commercialization of information products. As one commentator put it
assessing the property attributes of members’ rights to virtual world
assets and attempts to constrain such property rights by contract:
To state that such [contracts] presumptively knock out any
emergent property rights is to beg the question: why should we
permit consensual agreements that prevent formation of property
rights in the first instance any more than we tolerate other
consensual restraints on alienation? The function of property law
is in large part to resist contractual limitations on property use. If
the restraint on alienation limits the property in question to lowvalue uses, we term it an unreasonable restraint, and do not enforce
it. Thus, property law provides a rationale and a mechanism for
resisting the systematic expropriation of emergent online property
forms by use of contract.251
The limitation against constraints on alienation of property was the
main rationale leading the U.S. Supreme Court to enunciate the principles
of the first sale doctrine in the landmark judgment Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.

247. Id. at 26.
248. See Juliet M. Moringiello, What Virtual Worlds can do for Property Law, 62 FLA. L.
REV. 159, 178–90 (2010), on the application of the numerous clausus to virtual property.
249. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 2, at 1249–52 (applying the numerous clausus
principle to copies of copyright works).
250. Id.
251. Fairfield, supra note 173, at 1083–84 (alteration in original).
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Isidor Straus,252 later codified in the U.S. Copyright Act.253
What is more, targeted legislative measures, including making certain
exceptions to copyright infringement mandatory (or the rights or
privileges they create inalienable), or creating presumptions of invalidity
against contract terms that would seek to limit the application of
exceptions to infringement, are other means to qualify right holders’
freedom to commercialize information products.254
V. CONCLUSION
Information products traditionally embed a divide between the
intangible personal property (that belongs to intellectual property right
holders) and the tangible personal property of copies of information
products (that belong, but not always, to their recipients). The
dematerialization of copies brings another layer of complexity to the
tangible and intangible property divide: the information products that are
offered with a physical supporting medium are regulated differently than
the ones that are not, through public and private ordering. This
demarcation line is to a large extent arbitrary, resulting in unfair to double
standards as well as legal and normative incoherence if not degradation.
It contributes to the imbalance of power between suppliers and recipients.
While the over emphasis on the presence of a physical object is
attributable in part to a narrow understanding of tangible, there is hope
for a more reasoned delineation between tangible and intangible property
that does not altogether abandon this classification (which does in fact
offer conceptual value to a better understanding of property and still plays
a role in various areas of law). Taking a substantive and functional
approach to the attributes of tangible personal property, regardless of the
presence of a physical object, helps to realign the co-existence between
tangible and intangible property in many ways. It affirms that information
products may qualify as goods in some instances and distinguishes them
from services. The substantive and functional approaches to tangible
personal property identify situations when personal property in the
information product should reside with the recipient, not the supplier.
A functional similarity approach to digital copies of information
products, whether delivered online or embedded in a physical object,
accords with the principle of technological neutrality applied in
252. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
253. The first sale doctrine was codified in the year following Bobbs-Merrill and carried
forward in the Copyright Act of 1976. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
254. RADIN, supra note 82, at 168–70 (arguing that intellectual property user rights should
not be fully alienable in the context where “boilerplate” can “achieve widespread cancellation of
user rights” which “contributes to democratic degradation.”).
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Entertainment Software Association.255 It preserves the competing
property interests in the copy of the information product, which in turn
justify many exceptions to copyright infringement.256
Contract terms that ban personal property rights to recipients of
information products should be subjected to heightened scrutiny. Not
taking at face value contract terms that deny personal property rights to
recipients of information products will have rippling effects on the
application of the first sale or exhaustion doctrine, as well as other
exceptions to copyright infringement. Advocating that contract terms
banning personal property rights to recipients of information products
should be subject to higher scrutiny is a plea against the infinite
malleability of property. Just as property continues to be a powerful legal
and normative tool for suppliers to promote their interests, the force it
carries to protect the interests of recipients of information products needs
to be equally recognized.

255. See discussion supra Part II.D.
256. In particular the first sale or exhaustion doctrine.
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